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At the outbreak of the Second World War, Germany launched a 
devastating submarine campaign against the merchant marine 
traffic along the eastern seaboard of America. The antisubmarine 
defenses mounted by the United States were insufficient in the 
first months of 1942. This thesis examines how the United States 
Navy, in cooperation with the Army and the Coast Guard, began 
antisubmarine operations to protect the Chesapeake Bay and the 
surrounding area from the menace of Germany's U-boats during the 
first year of America's participation in World War II. 
This thesis complements the other histories of antisubmarine 
warfare during World War II, seeking to cover new ground by 
examining the defenses of Chesapeake Bay region in the 
antisubmarine campaign. Given the circumstances the nation faced 
at the start of the conflict, it was impossible to prevent the 
initial slaughter suffered by the merchant vessels off the 
Virginia shores. 
The thesis relies primarily upon the records held at the 
Naval Historical Center in Washington, D.C. Other sources 
include museums and archives throughout the Tidewater area, 
official histories, local historians, chronicles kept in private 
collections, and newspaper accounts. 
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CHAPTER X 
XNTRODUCTXON 
In the early years of the Second World War, America was the 
source of much-needed war material for Great Britain in its fight 
against Nazi Germany. Adolf Hitler knew that if the lifeline to 
Britain could be severed, that country would eventually succumb 
to his iron will. Once England fell, the rest of Europe would be 
his for the taking. Realizing this, he unleashed a deadly U-boat 
attack against the merchant traffic the sustained that island 
country. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, 
Hitler declared war on the United States. He ordered Rear 
Admiral Karl Doenitz, the head of the U-boat arm, to attack both 
the transatlantic convoys and the source of their supplies, the 
eastern coast of the United States. It was this order, aimed at 
bringing to a standstill the flow of material from America, that 
brought German submarines to the capes of Virginia, where they 
sank ship after ship during the first year of America's 
participation in the war. 
The capes of Virginia were an important target for the 
Germans, second only to the waters off New York. The shipping 
trade in the area was the reason the U-boats came to the shores 
of Virginia. But the area also had a potential for defense. It 
was home to the Norfolk Naval Station, the Naval Shipyard, and 
2 
the several Army forts that protected the mouth of the Chesapeake 
Bay. 
Virginia was at the center of the Fifth Naval District, 
which included Maryland (except Anne Arundel, Prince Georges, 
Montgomery, st. Marys, and Charles counties); West Virginia; 
Virginia (except the counties of Arlington, Fairfax, Stafford, 
King George, Prince William, and Westmoreland); and much of North 
Carolina (the counties of Currituck, Camden, Pasquotank, Gates, 
Perquimans, Chowan, Dare, Tyrrell, Washington, Hyde, Beaufort, 
Pamlico, Craven, Jones, Carteret, and Onslow), plus the Diamond 
Shoal Lightship. 1 It maintained a jurisdiction over coastal 
waters fifteen miles out to sea. The Norfolk Naval Station 
served as the headquarters for the Fifth Naval District. 
The German submarines brought death and destruction to the 
waters of the Fifth Naval District. It was in this district that 
85 vessels were attacked; of these, 67 were sunk, and 14 damaged. 
Only 4 escaped unharmed. Of all the vessels lost off the 
Virginia capes, more than 90 percent were sunk within the first 
six months in which this country was at war. 2 It was clear even 
in the Tidewater region that the U-boats were threatening the 
overall war effort. 
1Arthur A. Ageton, Thi~ Naval Officer's Guide (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1943), 65. 
2Fifth Naval District, "War Diary of Operational 
Intelligence," n.d. Box Number 390, 1-6, Operational Archives, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
3 
When the Second World War broke out, many residents still 
remembered the carnage wrought by a handful of German U-boats off 
the U.S. coast in the previous war. They did not anticipate that 
the amount of tonnage sent to the bottom in the area during the 
First World War would be minuscule in comparison to that in the 
Second. 
Nor did they know the magnitude of the disaster as it 
unfolded. "Little was published at the time," wrote David Stick 
in 1952, "In fact ••• material on World War II ship sinkings 
has been harder to dig out--and less detail has been unavailable-
-than for any other period since the War Of 1812."3 only 
recently, however, has information come to light on the slaughter 
that took place along our coasts in World War II. 
One cannot explain the slaughter without first discussing 
the weapon that caused it. The German U-boat that brought such 
carnage was diminutive in comparison to today's submarines. 
However, it was an efficient and destructive weapon, well-suited 
to its task. The Type IX submarine, which was the main predator 
on the eastern seaboard in the first six months of 1942, had a 
surface displacement of 1,051 tons, submerged, 1,178 tons. It 
was 76.5 meters in length, 6.76 meters across the beam, and 4.7 
meters in surfaced keel depth. It had a pressure hull 20.5 
millimeters thick, which allowed it to dive to depths of over 300 
meters and survive everything but direct hits. On average, it 
3 David Stick, Gravevard of the Atlantic: Shipwrecks off the 
North Carolina Coast (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1952), 228. 
4 
had a complement of forty-eight men, including four officers. It 
was the skill of the crew that determined how fast the boat could 
dive. In some cases, diving a few seconds faster would mean the 
difference between life and death. 4 
The IX Class had two monstrous diesel engines that allowed 
for a maximum surface speed of over eighteen knots. Two electric 
motors propelled the vessel underwater at a maximum speed of over 
seven knots. The range of the Type IX was either 12,000 nautical 
miles at an average speed of ten knots or 15,000 nautical miles 
at a speed of eight knots. 5 Submerged, its range was reduced 
dramatically, to only sixty-three miles at four knots. 
The weaponry that this U-boat carried was impressive. The 
standard IX carried twenty-two 21-inch torpedoes, fired from six 
tubes, four submerged bow tubes and two submerged stern tubes. 
Twelve of the torpedoes were kept within the pressure hull, and 
ten were stored in containers just below the deck. It carried 
both electric torpedoes, capable of thirty knots, and compressed 
air driven torpedoes, capable of forty-four knots. The electric 
torpedo was the most sought after by U-boat captains. When it 
was fired it did not leave a wake as did the compressed air 
torpedoes. The Type IX carried an 10.5 cm deck gun, which was 
occasionally used against ships to save torpedoes. It also 
carried a 3.7 cm anti-aircraft cannon on the deck and a 2.0 cm 
4Eberhard Rossler, 1he U-boat: The Evolution and Technical 
History of German Submarines, trans. Harold Erenberg (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1981), 105. 
5Ibid. 
machine gun in the conning tower for protection against sub-
hunting aircraft. 6 
5 
This thesis explains how Americans overcame and defeated the 
U-boats off the shores of Virginia during the first part of 1942. 
It focuses on the defenses of the Chesapeake Bay, a crucial 
waterway for the United States and the war effort. It describes 
the magnitude of the threat and how the United States Navy, 
cooperating with the Army and Coast Guard, brought security to 
the region. In less than a year, this cooperation brought the 
antisubmarine defenses to such a high degree of efficiency that 
they virtually ended U-boat operations in the waters of the Fifth 
Naval District. This study compliments the many works that 
already exist on the U-boat offensive that occurred off America's 
east coast during World War II. Only a few include a description 
of the defenses that were built off the Virginia capes. Most 
have sought to portray the big picture of the conflict, and do 
not provide much detail on the part played by Virginia. 
Generally, authors have examined the entire campaign of 1942 and 
defenses along the eastern seaboard with varying degrees of 
emphasis. Michael Gannon, author of Operation Drumbeat, gave an 
overview of the German offensive while taking the experiences of 
one particular U-boat captain, Reinhard Hardegen, in the U-123, 
as the central narrative. 7 Gannon, in company with Samuel Eliot 
6Erminio Bagnasco, l>ubmarines of World War II (Annapolis: 
United States Naval Institute, 1973), 70. 
7Michael Gannon. QR!~ration Drumbeat (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1990), 275. 
6 
Morison and Al Chewning, tend to be very critical of American 
antisubmarine operations, but their assertions need to be 
tempered by an awareness that antisubmarine defenses cannot be 
erected overnight. Good defenses take time to build. By 
recounting how the defenses off the Hampton roads were initiated, 
this study illustrates the size of this task. Military commands 
had to be established, personnel had to be selected and trained, 
and the scant resources that were available had to be pooled and 
then sent to areas where they would do the most good. These 
tasks took months. 
over fifty years have passed since the Battle of the 
Atlantic began, and it is fitting that now the story finally be 
told of how Tidewater forces participated in defeating the u-
boats. Many Virginia Beach residents still remember the oil 
washing up on the shores as well as other bits of debris from the 
ships that had fallen victim to the U-boats. They knew about the 
sinkings, but few knew how widespread they were. Only recently 
have the facts been revealed about the carnage that took place in 
the first months of 1942. This thesis will fill in the gaps of 
other authors, who have not given a detailed account of the 
defensive efforts undertaken by local forces, by giving an 
analysis of the defenses. It was a massive undertaking that was 
occurring all along the eastern coast of America. Thousands of 
men and women took part. It dictated that the armed forces 
overcome their rivalries, and it required careful planning. In 
the end~ however, the task of defeating the U-boats was 
accomplished. The sacrifices made were enormous. It is for 
those people who made the ultimate sacrifice in the battle 
against the U-boats that this story is now told. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
THE STORM ARRIVES 
on 7 December 1941, the United States was propelled into 
World War II. Hysteria gripped the Hampton Roads region when 
word of the Japanese atta.ck arrived. All military bases went on 
the highest stage of alert, and ships were hastily prepared for 
sea. Citizens and milita.ry leaders feared that the Axis powers, 
most likely Germany, would launch an attack against the military 
bases in the region, espe:cially against the Naval Operations Base 
in Norfolk. 1 No attack 01::curred, however, at least not against 
the military facilities. It was the merchant ships, beginning in 
January 1942, operating in American waters, that were eventually 
attacked. The weapon of choice for the Germans: the U-boat. 
The Germans despatched their submarines to the Atlantic coast and 
to the waters of the District for four reasons. According to an 
official analysis written after the offensive: 
First, every shiploa.d of oil or supplies sunk would 
either exact a toll on American civilian economy and 
war production, or upon the flow of supplies to 
England. Second, those ships used by the Navy to 
protect that northern route to England would have to be 
diverted in part or American coastal traffic would be 
eliminated. Third, every ship that went to the bottom 
off the Atlantic coa.st would constitute one less 
available bottom for any offensive armada later to be 
gathered by an American force bent on aiding the 
British. A fourth reason for the Axis to send U-boats 
1Fifth Naval District, "War Record of the Fifth Naval 
District, 1942," 1943, Guide no. 129, p. 1. Operational 
Archives, Naval Historica.l Center, Washington, D.C. 
was to appear after a few weeks of operation in 
American waters, namely, the lack of risk in a happy 
hunting ground where almost random discharge of a 
torpedo found a target and rarely brought retribution. 2 
9 
The east coast was a "happy hunting ground" because the U.S. Navy 
was using most of its escort vessels on the northern route to 
England. The result was many sinkings in the waters of the Fifth 
Naval District. 
In fact, the American defenses were completely unprepared 
for German U-boats when Hitler declared war on the United States. 
A plan to protect the merchant traffic sailing along the east 
coast did exist. The U.S. Navy had organized the eastern 
seaboard into an administrative unit entitled the Eastern Sea 
Frontier. The frontier was to be protected by Navy's Fleet and 
the Local Defense Forces. Since the fleet, however, became 
occupied with transatlantic convoys and was shuffled around to 
sea areas considered to have more urgent problems, the Local 
Defense Force assumed the burden of protecting the coast and the 
ships that travelled its expanse. 3 
In December 1941, the Fifth Naval District had only four 
ships capable of operating against enemy U-boats. Eventually, it 
acquired more vessels for antisubmarine defense, but the process 
was painstakingly slow. Small wonder, then, that the U-boat 
commanders ref erred to the early months of 1942 as their "second 
2Ibid., 2. 
3Commandant, Fifth Naval District, "History of the Fifth 
Naval District, 1939-1945," vol. 2, 1946, Guide no. 112, pp. 491-
92, Navy Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
10 
happy time." (The first of course, was in the waters around 
Britain in 1941.) The period was also described as the "merry 
massacre" and the "American shooting season." All the names were 
appropriate. German U-boats operated with little fear of 
retaliation from either American aircraft or escort vessels. Air 
patrols were limited. In the first months of 1942, only two 
flights daily from Langley Field, Virginia, were flown, both of 
one plane each. These aircraft posed little threat to the enemy, 
who was comparing the campaign in American waters to shooting 
ducks on a pond. 4 
The U.S. Navy's failure to organize convoys made merchant 
vessels vulnerable. The U-boat captains discovered right away 
that merchant vessels were still sailing independently, as though 
war had not been declared. The captains of merchantmen stopped 
their vessels close to torpedoed ships and asked for information 
about attacks over the loud hailer, making themselves vulnerable 
to attack. Ships that were hit but remained capable of steerage 
often did not bother to initiate a zigzag course or vary their 
speed so as to prevent a U-boat from delivering the coup de 
grace. Furthermore, the merchantmen had no idea of 
communications security; they chattered about everything under 
the sun over the 600-meter wave band--and if that was not enough, 
the coastal defense stations sent out over the airwaves a regular 
program of information, giving details of rescue work in 
progress, of where and when aircraft would be patrolling and the 
4Ibid., 677-78. 
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schedules of antisubmarine vessels. 5 Consequently, the Germans 
continued their reign of destruction along the eastern coast of 
the United States for months. Nearly every torpedo fired by a 
German U-boat claimed a victim, and when the torpedoes were 
expended the deck gun was almost equally effective. Towns that 
bordered the waters of the Fifth Naval District, where for a 
while there was no blackout order, heard nightly the sounds of 
battle along the coastline, witnessed the sinking ships offshore, 
and finally had to recover the bloated bodies of Allied merchant 
seamen that washed ashore. 6 
Fewer ships might have been sunk if the military authorities 
had ordered the local communities to dim their waterfront lights 
at the outbreak of the submarine offensive in January 1942. 
Unfortunately, three long and bloody months would pass before the 
lights were extinguished. When this obvious defense measure was 
first proposed, complaints were heard all along the east coast, 
even in Virginia Beach, where merchants feared that the tourist 
season would be ruined without nighttime illumination. 7 The neon 
lighting of large waterfront communities created a glowing 
backdrop that silhouetted shipping traffic near the shoreline. 
Ships were sunk and seamen drowned in order that the citizens of 
5Wolfgang Frank, The Sea Wolves (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1955), 111-12. 
6winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of 
Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), 117. 
7Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two Ocean War: A Short History of 
the United states Navy in the Second World War (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1963), 109. 
12 
these communities might enjoy pleasure as usual. It was not 
until 18 April 1942 that the Commander of the Eastern Sea 
Frontier, Admiral Andrews, ordered all waterfront lights and sky 
signs doused, three months after the submarine offensive had 
started. 8 
When Germany declared war on the United States on 11 
December 1941, conditions could hardly have been more propitious 
for Admiral Doenitz, the commander of Germany's underwater fleet. 
The Pearl Harbor attack forced the United States Navy to divert 
warships to the west coast. The forces at the Navy's disposal 
for the Atlantic defense were thus reduced at the very moment 
that America lost the protection of its neutrality. After two 
years of near-immunity from German attack, the United States Navy 
was unprepared for the new mission of coastal defense. The 
German submarine service, by contrast, was thoroughly battle-
hardened by twenty-seven months of war. 9 Furthermore, the sheer 
abundance of shipping along the east coast offered the well-
practiced Germans a chance to attack. On 9 December 1941, 
Doenitz Wrote in his War Diary the following entry, "The attempt 
must be made to exploit these advantages, which will disappear in 
the foreseeable future, and to strike a blow at the American 
coast with a drumbeat. 1110 
8Ibid. 
9Dan van der vat, The Atlantic Campaign (New York: Harper· & 
Row, 1988), 236. 
10Ibid. 
13 
"Drumbeat" is the translation of the codeword chosen for the 
German submarine offensive in the waters off the eastern coast of 
the United States: Operation Paukenschlag. Doenitz would launch 
the operation with not one drumbeat, but many. 
When Doenitz made the proposal to greet America's entry into 
World War II with literally "a beat on a kettledrum," he planned 
the immediate deployment of twelve Type IX long-range U-boats to 
operate in the coastal areas from New York down to the 
Caribbean. He sent the smaller shorter-range Type VIIC U-boats 
to operate off of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, which were up to 
1,000 miles closer to their bases in France. But on the 
following day, 10 December, the German Naval High Command allowed 
Doenitz only six Type IXs to strike the first blow in Operation 
Paukenschlag. Of these, five were ready to put to sea from the 
Biscay ports between 16 and 25 December. 11 Considering the 
number of U-boats that Doenitz could have employed, it was an 
unfortunate situation for the Germans. 
U-boats had been to American waters in World War I. 
Nevertheless, the 1918 offensive had been a shock, and in 1942 
the extent to which it had been forgotten and its lessons ignored 
was a surprise. The new offensive proved disastrous for the 
Allies. Reinhard Hardegen, commander of U-123, began the 
campaign on 12 January 1942, when he torpedoed the British 
freighter SS cyclops, 9,076 tons, some three hundred miles east 
11Admiral Karl Doenitz, Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days {New 
York: Leisure Books, 1959), 198. 
14 
of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. The first blows of the arriving 
submarines fell in mid-January in a tentative exploratory fashion 
at various points along the coast, first in the north and then in 
the south. They exacted many lives and ships. Similarly 
exploratory counter-measures by the thinly spread and 
inexperienced forces of the United States Navy had little chance 
against the battle-hardened Germans. 
At the time, America's resources were stretched to the 
limit. The transatlantic convoys to Britain demanded a variety 
of ships, and following Pearl Harbor a severe crisis ensued in 
the Pacific as the United States Navy attempted to stem the 
Japanese tide. Consequently, in the first month of 1942, the 
German U-boats operated with little fear of retribution. They 
sent ten ships to the bottom of the ocean in the waters of the 
Fifth Naval District. The coastline from Norfolk south to 
Wilmington, North Carolina, became the graveyard for numerous 
vessels. The enemy lay in wait off the Diamond Shoal's buoy and 
simply picked off the freighters and tankers as they rounded 
it.12 
The attacks by the five U-boats at the start of Operation 
Paukenschlag proved very successful. Doenitz reported the 
statistics of the operation in his War Diary: 
U-123 (Lieutenant Commander Hardegen) reported that 
eight ships (53,360 tons) had been sunk, among them 
three tankers; U-66 (Lieutenant Commander Topp) sank 
five ships (50,000 tons), of which one was a large 
freighter laden with iron ore and two were tankers; u-
12Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 3. 
130 (Lieutenant Commander Kals) got three laden tankers 
and one freighter with a total tonnage of 30,748 tons, 
and the toll taken by the remaining two boats was 
similarly high. 13 
15 
The War Record of the Fifth Naval District analyzed the 
attacks by the German U-boats. It reported, "Typically the 
enemies exploratory moves when meeting with success became 
determined and aggressive. 1114 The "Record" went on to say that 
"The German U-boats attacked almost with glee when they found 
that they could fire torpedoes at one ship lighted by the flaming 
remains of another. 1115 The U-boats discovered that Cape Hatteras 
was a key transit point for the merchant traffic, and the U-boats 
likewise found that ships below Hatteras could seek no haven even 
when they wished to lie-to at night. Night fell on many merchant 
ships before they could reach the next protected anchorage. On 
bright nights, when ships could be brought into the path of the 
moon, the U-boats seldom missed their targets. 
The first casualty in the Fifth Naval District did not occur 
until six days after Hardegen had claimed the SS Cyclops. It was 
in the early hours of 18 January, just off the coast of North 
Carolina. Two torpedoes from the U-66 split the Standard Oil 
tanker Allan Jackson in half. The ship foundered within ten 
minutes. Twenty-two sailors lost their lives. By the end of the 
13Doeni tz , Memoirs, 2 O 3 . 
14Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 2. 
month eight more ships had met similar fates off the Virginia-
North Carolina coastline.~ 
Meanwhile, the public was encouraged to think that the 
coastal sinkings were of no serious importance. The Navy 
released reports claiming that counter-attacks were efficiently 
sending U-boats to the bottom of the Atlantic. Wild rumors of 
16 
captured submarines being towed into ports were heard from Maine 
to Florida. Tidewater residents of the Virginia Beach area even 
claimed to have seen a submarine being clandestinely pulled into 
the Norfolk Naval Base. Unfortunately, these rumors were without 
foundation. The first statement about the U-boat onslaught, 
skillful in its avoidance of the extent of German success, was 
released by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox on 24 January 1942, 
it read as follows: 
There are many rumors and unofficial reports about the 
capture or destruction of enemy submarines. Some of 
the recent visitors to our territorial waters will 
never enjoy the return portion of their voyage. 
Furthermore, the percentage of one-way traffic is 
increasing, while that of two-way traffic is 
satisfactorily on the decline. But there will be no 
information given out about the fate of enemy submarine 
excursionists who don't get home, until that 
information is no longer of aid and comfort to the 
enemy. This is a phase which is not only important 
from the purely military viewpoint of naval operations 
but from the viewpoint of psychological counter-
offensive as well. The Nazis think themselves pretty 
clever in the field of psychological warfare. Secrecy 
surrounding the fate of these submarines is a counter-
blow the American people can give them which may serve 
to shake some of their super-confidence. It is a game 
in which every American can and should participate. 
16Ibid. I 3. 
The Navy will take care of enemy submarines, and the 
people can help the Navy and the country by keeping 
quiet about what they see or hear of the process or its 
results. The press and radio have made a great, 
patriotic contribution by voluntarily disciplining 
themselves in the matter of reporting such incidents as 
may have come to their attention unofficially. All the 
people can make the same contribution. Even if you 
have seen a submarine captured or destroyed, keep it to 
yourself. Let the enemy guess what happened. 17 
17 
Nevertheless, the unadorned fact was that nobody in civilian 
life or the armed forces could have given out authentic 
information as to German U-boats captured or sunk in the waters 
off of Virginia or for that matter the entire east coast. The 
reason was that no German vessel had met either fate. 
A few days later, however, Chief Aviation Machinist's Mate 
Donald Francis Mason, a PBY-Catalina pilot operating with the 
Atlantic Patrol Squadron Eighty-Two out of Argentia, 
Newfoundland, reported that he had sighted what appeared to be a 
U-boat and dropped his brace of bombs. The Navy's public 
relations officers transformed the report into language that 
compared Mason to Oliver Hazard Perry. Mason's supposed 
transmission appeared on the front pages of newspapers all across 
the country. It read, "Sighted sub, sank same." It won rapid 
acceptance into the national locution. 18 Mason would again enter 
the history books a few months later, when he became the second 
U.S. serviceman to claim a U-boat sinking. This time, without 
17New York Times, 24 January 1942, 1. 
1sGannon, Operation Drumbeat, 275. 
18 
the Navy's public relations officers, he sank the U-503 southeast 
of Virgin Rocks. He immediately earned an ensign's stripe. 19 
Admiral Doenitz, a restless man, meanwhile, undoubtedly 
paced the floors of his off ice in Lorient, France; he was in a 
sense on trial. Hitler and his closest advisors were as land-
minded as the policy-makers of World War I. After a quarter of a 
century, the judgment of Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz on the German 
High Command was again true: "They do not understand the sea. 1120 
But Hitler and his aides would understand figures that showed 
tonnage destroyed. Doenitz, therefore, expected his u-boat 
commanders to show the world a spate of sinkings that would never 
be forgotten. 
German submarine commanders were bold in the waters off of 
Virginia, and for that matter all along the American east coast. 
one particular case in point occurred the night of 24 January 
1942, off of the Virginia Capes. The U-66, under the command of 
Richard Zapp, sank the four-month-old motor tanker Empire Gem, 
bound for Britain with a cargo of 10,600 tons of gasoline from 
Port Arthur in the Carribean. At 0240, it was shaken by two 
torpedoes. The flames that enveloped her allowed Zapp to pick up 
the outline of the U.S. ore carrier Venore. 21 The U-boat raced 
ahead to lie in ambush for the oncoming vessel. Zapp pretended 
to be the Diamond shoal's Lightship that normally occupied the 
19Ib' d 380 l. • ' • 
ZOVat, Atlantic Campaign, 116. 
21Gannon, operation Drumbeat, 270. 
19 
area, and signaled the Ve~ to pass close to the lightship. It 
then fired two torpedoes into the vessel at short range. The 
Venore, with 22,300 tons of iron ore, sunk with the loss of 
twenty-three crewmen.n 
As the slaughter continued, Doenitz ordered another group of 
U-boats to the east coast of the United States. This time he 
employed Type VII U-boats. They averaged 750 tons displacement 
and were called "medium high-seas boats." With a radius of 
action of 7,000 to 8,000 nautical miles, they had been designed 
for employment against convoys in the middle of the Atlantic. 
All concerned, however, were surprised and pleased at the 
performance of the Type VIIs in American waters: "··· their 
radius of action was found in practice to be considerably greater 
than our [the German Naval High Command] theoretical calculations 
and previous experience had led us to assume."23 This was partly 
due to fuel saving procedures adopted by their chief engineers on 
the outward passage. But another reason persisted, which Doenitz 
outlines in his diary, and which also indicates the sacrifices 
the crews of German U-boats made in their hunt against merchant 
traffic in American waters: 
In their eagerness to operate in American waters the 
crews sought every means to help themselves. They 
filled some of the drinking-and washing water tanks 
with fuel. Of their own free will they sacrificed many 
of the amenities of their living quarters in order to 
make room for the larger quantities of stores, spare 
nibid., 118. 
23Doenitz, Memoirs, 204-5. 
parts and other expendable articles which an increase 
in the radius of action demanded.~ 
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As the months passed, the battle between the German U-boats 
and the forces of the Fifth Naval District waxed hot. January 
witnessed eight merchant sinkings, while February saw only seven. 
February's toll was less than January's only because the merchant 
traffic took up the practice of frantic and temporary scrambling 
for safety at night. The U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces hit back 
feebly at an enemy that grew bolder with each passing day. A 
break occurred in February, temporarily, but U.S. officials could 
only wait until U-boats returned in force for a second charge. 
It came with fury in March, by far the darkest month for the 
forces of the Fifth Naval District, when the Germans sank 
nineteen ships. The casualties had reached by the end of that 
month a total of forty-one ships, or 220,488 tons, since the 
American entry into the war. Thousands of tons of supplies and 
many lives had been lost. Empty life jackets became a common 
sight at sea. Occasionally, survivors were rescued and they 
would tell of the horror of the enemy firing at close range 
insuring the sinking and of their suffering in the ocean. 
Sometimes a Coast Guard Cutter would find life jackets whose 
wearers had nothing to tell. Such scenes were repeated 
frequently in the waters of the Fifth Naval District, which was 
~Ibid, 205. 
soon becoming the most dangerous place in the world for Allied 
shipping. 25 
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Operation Paukenschlag reached its furious climax in March, 
when U-boats sank twenty ships along the east coast in a little 
over a week. The score for a slightly over two months was 145 
ships, totalling over aoo,ooo tons, with a loss of over 600 
lives. As the battle became heated, the military authorities 
expressed the magnitude and loss in concrete terms. The average 
freighter carried an amount of cargo equal to four trains of 
seventy-five cars each. A standard tanker loaded enough gasoline 
on one voyage to supply the holder of an "A" ration book with gas 
for 35,000 years.~ 
Before March changed into April, however, the statistic 
compilers had to add several new losses, for on the last day of 
March, in slightly over twenty-four hours, U-boats sank six more 
vessels: city of New York, Tiger, T.C. McCobb, Menominee, 
Barnegat and the Alleghen~. It appeared that nothing could stop 
the slaughter. 
April came, and the tune changed. District convoys were 
initiated and at last, escort and patrol ships and planes made 
their presence known. Defense forces began to move aggressively 
against the U-boats. The newly-arriving U-boats, however, gave 
every evidence of starting a truly overwhelming third assault. 
They did score some more hits in the waters of the Fifth Naval 
25Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 3-4. 
26vat, .Atlantic Campaign, 124. 
District. Twenty-two ships were attacked in April and eighteen 
of them were sunk. May witnessed two attacks with one sunk. 
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June listed a casualty rate of twelve sinkings, while July 
witnessed only two sinkings. By this time, however, attacks were 
harder for the Germans to carry out. U-boats had to stay 
submerged longer, move more stealthily, and experience the 
morale-sapping horror of depth-charging more frequently. 
In April, the United States claimed its first kill on a u-
boat in U.S. waters. On the night of 14 April 1942, the Wickes-
class flush-decker destroyer USS Roper (DD 147) engaged and sank 
the U-85 under the command of Eberhard Greger. Twenty-nine 
bodies were eventually recovered, some with personal diaries that 
described the boat's last days. The second sinking occurred on 9 
May, when the 165-foot cutter Icarus sank the U-352 under the 
command of Hellmut Rathke. This time, however, thirty-three 
crewmen were able to escape with their lives. In April, for the 
first time, German life jackets were picked up in American 
territorial waters bearing silent victims. In that same month, 
the Army, Navy and Coast Guard, in cooperation, were able to 
break Doenitz's plan. They hammered the enemy U-boats steadily 
until 15 July 1942, almost six months to the day from the 
launching of the first torpedo in Operation Paukenschlag. On 
that day the last ship to be attacked in the waters of the Fifth 
Naval District was torpedoed. The battle was over for Virginia 
and the Fifth Naval District. The U-boats had failed, and 
America's defenses had prevailed.n 
nFifth Naval District, "War Record," 4 .. 
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CHAPTER III 
The Navy Reacts to the storm 
The threat presented by German U-boats was very real and 
very deadly, as related in the preceding chapters. The Navy knew 
before the outbreak of war that its defenses would have to be 
upgraded to repel Axis submarines. The Capes of Virginia and the 
Chesapeake Bay were the focal points that lay within the Fifth 
Naval District requiring the protection of the Navy. The Bay was 
of special interest, as it was invaluable to the economic well 
being of the country and the war effort. Furthermore, marine 
traffic needed protection to insure safe passage of goods to and 
from United States Allies, above all England, the one remaining 
bastion of the anti-Nazi effort in Europe. 
Whereas the Army had the responsibility of repelling any 
assaults against the shore with its forts and ground forces, the 
Navy had the responsibility of protecting and controlling 
merchant traffic with its patrol vessels. Furthermore, in 
addition to protecting and controlling merchant traffic, the Navy 
also had the mission of destroying enemy vessels found in U.S. 
territorial waters. By working together as dictated in "Joint 
Action of the Army and Navy (FTP 155)," the two services sought 
to prevent any intrusion by the enemy. 1 
1Commandant, Fifth Naval District, "History of the Fifth 
Naval District, 1939-1945," vol. 2, 1945, Guide no. 112, p. 523. 
Navy Library, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
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In the Navy's view, to start with, the best weapon against 
the Nazi U-boats along the East Coast was the Local Defense 
Force, as established by the Navy's Basic War Plan Rainbow #1 
(WPL-42) issued in the fall of 1939. The Local Defense Forces 
consisted not only of naval vessels in the area, but also those 
vessels of the Coast Guard after the Navy had assumed command of 
that service in accordance with a directive from President 
Roosevelt. These Local Defense Forces bore the brunt of 
defending American coasts against the enemy U-boats. 2 
In the spring of 1941, as the United States inched toward 
involvement in the war in Europe, the Navy issued Basic War Plan 
Rainbow #5 (WPL-46), which put coastal defenses on a war-time 
footing and set fortha number of specific goals and tasks. As a 
result of Rainbow #5, the Local Defense Force in the Fifth Naval 
District had numerous responsibilities: maintaining the security 
of the harbors, sweeping for mines, patrolling the coast, and 
protecting shipping. 3 Unfortunately, the jobs were easier said 
than done. 
On the eve of World War II, the United States had a 
formidable navy in terms of sheer tonnage (over 300,000 tons). 
But the picture of strength presented by this figure was 
deceiving. Half of this force was in capital ships--vessels that 
could make no effective contributions to the prosecution of an 
antisubmarine campaign. This imbalance in shipbuilding reflected 
2Ibid., 418-419. 
3Ibid., 494. 
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tradition more than anything else. It failed to grasp the Navy's 
pragmatic needs. President Roosevelt put his finger on this 
inherent weakness in American naval thinking when he wrote to 
Winston Churchill complaining that "the Navy couldn't see any 
vessel under a thousand tons. 114 As a former Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, Roosevelt promoted the World War I submarine chasers 
that had performed so well in coastal waters. Unfortunately, 
they could not withstand the rigors of duty in the Atlantic 
Ocean. 
Herein lay one of the fundamental deficiencies of American 
naval forces at a historic turning point. The Navy had made a 
commitment to ships which were far too big. On the other hand, 
the Commander-in-Chief preferred craft which were far too small. 
Nobody seemed willing to promote the ships that the Navy actually 
needed--escort vessels of seagoing type, destroyers, destroyer 
escorts and cutters. The decision would eventually be made, but 
after thousands of tons of merchant shipping had been sunk. 
In a report to Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, 
U.S. Fleet, in January 1941, Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews, 
Commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier, which 
consisted of the American east coast down to North Carolina, he 
stated, "Should the enemy submarines operate off this coast, this 
command has no forces available to take action against them, 
either offensively or defensively."s 
4Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 178-79. 
SVat, .The Atlantic Campaign , 241. 
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The unpreparedness for war was not simply a naval problem. 
America's democratic government and civilian population was three 
thousand miles from the scene of battle. They had been reared on 
isolationism and had enjoyed over three-quarters of a century of 
peace at home. It was only logical that defense of the 
continental United States against direct attack was not a burning 
priority. 
Nevertheless, the responsible officers in the Navy had 
forgotten the lessons learned in 1918, when six U-boats had sunk 
over 95 ships along the east coast of the United States in little 
less than six months. 6 
One reason for the Navy's poor memory was that between World 
War I and the beginning of World War II, the Navy had been 
obsessed with the idea of maintaining a two-ocean fighting fleet 
that emphasized the construction of capital ships. This fleet 
was designed to meet other fleets of heavy ships on the high 
seas. Unfortunately, what now transpired was that the Navy faced 
an attack by small vessels--German U-boats, and these vessels 
aimed not at the Navy's fleet force but America's merchantmen. 
At the heart of the matter lay a simple, but horrible fact: the 
sheer lack of antisubmarine vessels and aircraft. The British 
Admiralty had neglected small craft until the outbreak of war in 
1939, the Navy Department failed to learn from this mistake, and 
neglected the same craft as well which in World War I had been 
shown to be essential for dealing with enemy submarines. The 
6Ibid .. 
reason was that the Navy, and U.S. legislators, too, believed 
that small vessels could be constructed quickly by using mass 
production methods. 7 
Consequently, at the time of Pearl Harbor, the Fifth Naval 
District was equipped with only four vessels--World War I era 
submarine chasers--capable of offensive action against 
submarines. The district was also in desperate need of naval 
patrol aircraft. Some short range aircraft were available, but 
the Navy needed aircraft that had the ability of searching far 
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out to sea. 8 Facing thesf~ limitations as the Germans challenged 
our coasts were, as noted above, Admiral Ernest J. King and Rear 
Admiral Adolphus Andrews, Commander of the North Atlantic Naval 
Coastal Frontier. 
The Navy's frontier system, created in 1929 and put into 
effect on 1 July 1941, then redefined in February 1942, involved 
assigning ocean zones of responsibility running out from a 
defined section of coastline for approximately 200 miles. The 
northernmost zone, which was home to the Argentia base in 
Newfoundland, was known as the Canadian Coastal Zone. Next came 
the Eastern Sea Frontier, extending from Nova Scotia to 
Jacksonville, Florida, and containing such ports as New York, the 
Chesapeake Bay, Wilmington, Charleston, and Savannah. Below the 
Eastern Sea Frontier lay the Gulf Sea Frontier, which took in the 
7John Terraine, The U-boat Wars, 1916-1945 (New York: G.P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1989), 410. 
8commandant, "History," 677-78. 
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whole coast of Florida, most of the islands in the Bahamas, part 
of Cuba, the entire Gulf of Mexico and the Yucatan Channel. 
Contiguous with the Gulf Sea Frontier was the Caribbean Sea 
Frontier, comprising of the Antilles, Trinidad and the Dutch 
islands of curaco and Aruba with their extensive oil refineries. 
Finally, came the Panama Sea Frontier, which straddled the 
Isthmus, facing both ways in America's two-ocean war. Admiral 
King, while addressing his critics about convoys, estimated the 
area within these frontiers that he had to cover was over 700,000 
square miles, which may be taken as the measure of the task 
facing him and the Navy and the difficulty it had in establishing 
a convoy system. 9 
The frontiers were further broken up into naval districts. 
The Eastern Sea Frontier, Admiral Andrew's command, consisted of 
seven districts, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh 
and Eighth Naval Districts. The primary naval officer of the 
Fifth Naval District was the commandant. This post was held by 
Rear Admiral Manley H. Simons at the outbreak of the war. As the 
U-boat campaign heated up in the waters of the Fifth Naval 
District, it was recognized that the Commandant could not 
possibly handle all the tasks confronting him in managing the 
District. Consequently, the post of Assistant Commandant was 
created in June 1942 in an effort to alleviate some of the 
9Terraine, U-boat Wars, 414. 
workload facing him. Captain Russel s. Crenshaw was assigned 
this post on 18 June 1942. 10 
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Rear Admiral Simons's predecessor as commandant of the Fifth 
Naval District, Rear Admiral Joseph Taussig, had the unenviable 
task of attempting to obtain antisubmarine vessels in the period 
before the war began. Rainbow #5 required that they obtain 
enough ships for the Local Defense Force. Not including the four 
World War I era sub chasers that the commandants already had, 
they were able to acquire four 125-f oot Coast Guard cutters and 
one 165-foot Coast Guard cutter. Two additional World War I era 
sub chasers were assigned but were not available because they 
were undergoing repairs. 11 
Discounting the four World War I sub chasers, which were 
mainly employed as protection for the minesweepers and assistance 
in laying buoys, and two of the 125-foot CGCs, which were usually 
in drydock undergoing repairs, only the 165 foot cutter, the two 
World War I era sub chasers and the two 125-f oot Cutters were 
actually available in January 1942 to keep the sea lanes open and 
to operate against the enemy submarines. These five vessels were 
the seagoing patrol force that was supposed to protect all 
shipping in and around the waters of the Fifth Naval District. 12 
In accordance with Rainbow #5, the Commandants were directed 
to obtain "vessels from other sources," but few such vessels were 
10commandant, "History, 11 489. 
11Ibid., 677. 
12Ibid. 
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available. Admiral Simons had the authority to buy ocean-going 
craft from the civilian sector. Unfortunately, no privately 
owned craft fulfilling the minimum specifications for duty were 
found in the district. Those deamed suitable for conversion were 
unobtainable, because the owners refused to sell. Of the 
nineteen vessels envisioned, only one, the Maryland pilot boat 
Baltimore, was acquired; she did not enter service until late 
February 1942. Ships obtained from government sources, however, 
were all ill equipped, lacking radar and sonar, and although the 
Coast Guard ships were the best, they too were badly in need of 
repairs. As a result, the Fifth Naval District had an 
insufficient number of patrol vessels. Simply put the defenses 
mustered at the start of the war were inadequate for the 
formidable task at hand. 13 
Admiral Simons, however, never gave up seeking new ships for 
his district. He frequently asked Admirals King and Andrews to 
give him more. The latter were aware of Simons's predicament, 
but were in the difficult position of having to send the few 
ships available to the areas they determined to be in the most 
critical need, that is, the Pacific and the middle and eastern 
Atlantic. 
The Navy also lacked suitable aircraft to fight German u-
boats. In certain ways, the aircraft situation was even worse 
than the ship situation. An Army Appropriation Act passed by 
Congress in 1920 stated that the Army would control all land-
13Ibid. I 497. 
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based planes and the Navy sea-based aircraft. Unfortunately, the 
United states had no organization comparable to coastal Command 
of the Royal Air Force, which, despite certain deficiencies, was 
trained in the delicate a.rt of maritime patrol, which required 
the following: special navigation skills, ship-recognition 
abilities and being trained in antisubmarine tactics. 14 
Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the war it was upon the pilots 
and the aircraft of the Army that the Navy had to rely on for 
antisubmarine patrols and searches. To make matters worse these 
United states Army Air Force (USAAF) aircraft were not equipped 
for communication with ships and its pilots untutored in 
cooperation with the sea service. 15 
Prior to the arrival of German U-boats in the coastal waters 
of America, two flights daily of one plane each from Langley 
Field patrolled the shipping lanes in the Fifth Naval District. 
The flights began on 18 December 1941 by the 65th Observation 
Group of the First Air support Command. These patrols flew from 
shore to a line forty miles off shore stretching from Cape 
Henlopen to Cape Hatteras. These patrols were gradually extended 
until by the middle of January, the 65th Group was making patrols 
from Langley twice daily on a course of 125 degrees east-
southeast for 600 miles to seaward and back. 16 
14Donald Macintyre, Battle of the Atlantic (New York: 
Macmillan, 1961), 139. 
15Terraine, U-boat Wars, 417. 
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Admiral Simons, however, had a different vision of what the 
Army patrol should be. In a personal letter to General Tilton on 
10 January 1942, the Admiral stated that the ideal patrol would 
be as follows: 
Six long range patrol planes with three flights daily; 
the patrol plane would proceed to a point 150 miles 
offshore and then zigzag south as far as the latitude 
of Diamond Shoals, returning then to base. In this way 
three times daily that part of the ocean is searched 
where carrier or catapult operations could be carried 
on.11 
At the beginning of the war it was recognized that a key 
target for the German u-boats would be the region off the Capes 
of Virginia leading to the Chesapeake Bay. As a result, on 19 
December 1941, a presidential directive established the 
Chesapeake-Norfolk Defensive Sea Area--a military zone in which 
the combined armed forces of the Army and Navy would work 
together to repel any armed offensive. On 15 July 1941, the 
Chief of Naval operations set up the following boundaries for the 
Defensive Sea Area: 
A line running from the southernmost point of Cape 
Charles, Virginia, to Cape Charles Lighthouse on Smith 
Island, thence on a bearing 130 true to seaward limit 
of U.S. territorial waters to the parallel Latitude 36 
51' 15" North and thence west meeting the shore at the 
United States Coast Guard Station, Virginia Beach, 
Virginia. 18 
On 11 December 1941, supervision of this area was begun with 
the installation of the outer Guard Ship approximately four miles 
east of Cape Henry. The issuance of "Notice to Mariners" on 24 
17Ibid. 
18commandant, "History," 618. 
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December 1941, formally instructed all incoming vessels 
approaching the Bay to stop and make contact with the outer guard 
ship for identification. Only after permission was granted could 
the vessels enter the Chesapeake Bay. Ships registered with the 
local pilots were exempt, and this provision alleviated some of 
the burden of the outer guard ship, which had to process the 
increasing number of vessels seeking safe anchorage in the Bay. 
Along with the outer guard ship, an inner guard was 
established in mid-December 1941 along the channel inside of the 
Capes. Two 75-foot patrol craft served as the inner guard. 
These and the outer guard were the only patrols available in the 
region until April 1942, when additional vessels were assigned. 19 
In January 1942, an additional feature was added to the 
defenses of the Bay: an examination vessel. The vessel, placed 
inside the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay, would place naval 
personnel on suspicious vessels arriving from foreign and neutral 
ports. The first ship assigned to this position was the United 
states coast Guard cutter Jackson, which served as the 
examination vessel until replaced by the lightship Diamond 
Shoals, which was anchored just north of the channel entrance. 20 
The U-boat menace had been foremost in King's mind when he 
was Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, but as the Pacific war 
19Ibid. I 623-25. 
20Ibid., 632. The Diamond Shoals performed vital functions 
during the period of the submarine offensive until she was rammed 
and sunk by a passing tugboat late in the war. It had been so 
crucial to.harbor operations that it was replaced the next day. 
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heated up he became primarily interested in that theater of 
operations. 21 It was natural. As bad as the submarine threat 
was, greater dangers elsewhere took King's attention. His 
immediate priority, once war was declared, was to stop Japan, 
and, together with General George c. Marshall, to work with the 
British Chiefs of Staff to develop a unified Allied strategy.n 
In the Pacific, the United States Navy was fighting almost alone 
against a major sea power. In the Atlantic, King believed, the 
battle should be left to the British. King had the attitude that 
"it was Britain's problem, let them handle it. 1123 This posture 
may have been a cover for the wily admiral. In fact, his hands 
were tied. The United States Navy was not ready for the Battle 
of the Atlantic. owing to prewar naval disarmament treaties, 
isolationism, the Depression, and a variety of other causes, the 
Navy had neither the resources nor the organization to fight 
submarines. King could only urge his commanders to do the best 
they could with what they had. It would not be enough.~ 
As the United states entered World War II, the Navy was 
making efforts to prevent U-boats from entering American harbors. 
They included setting out antisubmarine nets and booms. The need 
21Thomas B. Buell. Master of Sea Power, A Biography of Fleet 
Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980). 
nibid., 283. 
23Felix Reisenberg, !;ea War (New York: Rinehart and company, 
1956), 119. 
~Ladislas Farago. The Tenth Fleet (New York: Ivan Obolensky, 
1982), 84. 
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for these seemed clear even before the war began. A month before 
the Axis powers declared hostilities against the United States, 
Rear Admiral Simons wrote Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval 
Operations, advising the following: 
it is in my opinion ••• (we should) begin putting in 
our harbor entrance nets and possibly(lay) some of our 
harbor entrance mine fields. It would seem from the 
newspapers, that possibly the war in the Atlantic is 
now approaching our side.ll 
However, in spite of this foresight, net defenses were 
implemented only after Pearl Harbor. Because of the large gap 
and turbulent waters between the Capes, the nets were impractical 
at that distance out to sea. The calmer water at the entrance to 
Hampton Roads, however, made the use of nets both efficient and 
effective. The installation of the Hampton Roads net began on 
the day after Pearl Harbor. By 23 January 1942, the Commander, 
Inshore Patrol, reported that the gate in the completed anti-
motorboat boom across the entrance to the Roads was in operation, 
it was normally open during daylight and closed at night. In 
addition, a four-foot-mesh, antisubmarine net was later installed 
under the boom. Completed by 21 September 1942, this net was 
designed to stop enemy "midget" submarines like those used by the 
Japanese at Pearl Harbor. 
While the Navy installed these nets it also placed anti-
torpedo nets at other locations considered vital and vulnerable 
to enemy attack. They covered the pier at the Naval Operations 
Base, the Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Newport News Shipbuilding 
llcommandant, "History," 518. 
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and Drydock. The nets remained in place throughout the period of 
the German submarine offensive and were removed only in late 
1943. They were kept in storage in case they should be needed 
aqain. 26 
The Navy installed other nets at the entrance to the York 
River. In World War I, the York was a fleet anchorage. Although 
it was never used as such during World War II, the Navy prepared 
the area for should an emergency situation arise. The nets went 
in starting on 26 December 1941. By March 1942 the Navy 
completed its other defensive measures. They consisted of anti-
motorboat booms and other fixed obstructions. These defenses, 
like the ones mentioned previously, were removed in the fall of 
1943, when the U-boat threat had largely disappeared.v 
The Navy believed that not only enemy submarines but enemy 
mines were a strong possibility. In World War I, German U-boats 
had laid mines at Thimble Shoals, near the entrance of the Bay, 
as well as in the areas just south of Cape Henry and the area 
south of Winter Quarter Shoal. Accordingly, these areas began to 
be swept regularly as soon as America entered the war. The Navy 
also swept the following on a regular basis: Parramore Bank, 
Lookout Shoal, Diamond Shoal, Lookout Bight, and the Capes of the 
Chesapeake. 
Because the areas to be swept were vast, swept channels were 
eventually instituted. By 18 December 1941, the first permanent 
26Ibid., 518-20. 
VIbid., 521. 
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buoys marked a swept channel off the entrance of the Bay. For 
friendly vessels, however, the swept channel could not remain in 
the same place. This was the result of several factors: the 
fluctuating numbers of incoming and outgoing merchant ships, 
enemy activity within the region that threatened maritime 
traffic, and recently-sunken vessels that became a hazard to 
navigation.u 
To guard against U-boats the Navy laid elaborate mine 
fields. It did so to destroy enemy submarines primarily but also 
to deter them. Neither aim was achieved. Far from trapping the 
U-boats or discouraging them, the mine fields rendered the 
already dangerous navigation situation even more hazardous for 
American and Allied merchantmen. One of the initial plans called 
for a mine field stretching the coast of Maine down to Florida. 
It was rejected as impractical, and instead two major mine fields 
were laid to defend U.S. Atlantic coasts. The largest mine 
field, consisting of over 3,300 was laid around the anchorage on 
the Gulf side of Key West. The field proved to be a curse rather 
than a blessing, because it forced all westbound traffic to take 
an additional eighteen to twenty hours to steam around the 
28Ibid., 589-595. Changing channels frequently confused the 
captains of the merchant ships. The confusion would finally be 
eliminated on 24 July 1943, when the third Commandant of the 
~ifth Naval District, Rear Admiral Robert F. Leary, created a 
single swept channel for both the incoming and outgoing traffic. 
Furthermore, the channel was kept as straight as possible, which 
eliminated the confusion created by turns that had been part of 
the previous channels. By maintaining a single channel, it also 
allowed the few minesweepers available in the District to be put 
to better use. 
Rebecca Shoals before entering the safety of an anchorage. It 
was so dangerous to navigate that during the first ten weeks of 
the field's existence, four ships entered it, hit mines, and 
sank. 29 
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The other mine field, which consisted of 365 mines, was laid 
off the Capes of the Chesapeake. Its dangers were demonstrated 
tragically on 15 July 1942. While attempting to conduct two 
damaged vessels to Hatteras Inlet after an encounter with the u-
576 off of Ocracoke Inlet, North Carolina, Captain Newton Nichols 
in the .§R!:y, a Navy Corvette, led the tanker Mowinckel and the 
freighter Chilore directly into the Hatteras mine fields. 
Captain Nichols, who was a retired officer in the United States 
Navy, apparently was unaware of the existence of this dangerous 
area. He had instead a "rather hazy recollection" that there 
were some restrictions on anchoring west of Hatteras. Warning of 
the mine field had been given in the "Notice to Mariners 175, 11 
issued on 20 May. Captain Nichols apparently had never received 
it. The results were deadly.~ 
Immediately upon entry into the mine field, the damaged 
vessels Mowinckel and Chilore encountered contact mines and were 
shaken by several explosions. Under the impression that his tiny 
flotilla was once again under attack by a U-boat, Nichols ordered 
the ships, defenseless as they were, abandoned. The crews took 
~Farago, Tenth Fleet, 96. 
3°Robert Freeman, War Diary: Eastern Sea Frontier (New Jersey: 
Shellback Press, 1987), 414. 
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to the life boats and rowed to the safety of the shore. Shortly 
thereafter, the Coast Guard patrol vessel 462, which had been 
placed on duty in the area to warn away ships from the endangered 
waters, caught up with Nichols in the .§R!:y. From the Coast Guard 
patrol vessel Nichols learned for the first time his exact 
position and realized the extent of the danger. Realizing that 
he could give no real assistance to the merchantmen, he conned 
the ~ out of the mine field, and behind the 462 proceeded to 
rejoin the convoy that he had left earlier. 
The sequel to this unhappy event was just as unfortunate. 
Within a few days, a channel was swept into the ships where they 
lay in the dangerous area. Two tugs were directed to bring them 
out. One, the Keshena, mistakenly moved out of the swept 
channel, struck a mine, and rapidly sank. The other tug brought 
the vessels out safely, but as they were being towed to Hampton 
Roads to be salvaged, the Chilore capsized and was never righted. 
Such accidents often occurred. As long as there were minefields 
and ignorant captains, the tragedies would occur again and 
again. 31 
While booms and mines were put in place, both the military 
and civilian sectors were initiating imaginative proposals. The 
British Admiralty proposed that the United States Navy should 
construct a mine barrier along the 3,000 miles of the east coast. 
As mentioned, Americans had already studied the plan and 
discarded it as unrealistic. An amateur sailor suggested 
31Ibid., 418-19. 
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def ending the Atlantic seaboard by deploying a string of scout 
boats within hailing distance of one another, five miles off the 
coast from Nova Scotia to the Florida Keys. Another amateur 
proposed setting up antisubmarine nets along the entire coast. 32 
President Roosevelt contemplated reviving "Q-ships," armed 
merchantmen disguised as helpless targets to lure U-boats into an 
attack. At the proper moment, the crew of the Q-ship would 
unmask its ordnance, open fire on a U-boat that it had attracted 
and destroy it. During World War I, the British had had 
spectacular successes with the Q-ships, but in 1939 and 1940, 
they proved something of a failure, German U-boats sinking two of 
them. The United States Navy, nevertheless, decided to employ 
its own Q-ships, perhaps in deference to its commander-in-
chief. 33 
"Project LQ," began on 19 February 1942, when three ships 
were purchased and secretly refitted as Q-vessels--two 3,200-ton 
freighters, the ss Carolyn and Evelyn, and the trawler Wave. For 
security reasons they were renamed. The Wave became the u.s.s. 
n T.J. Belke, "Roll of Drums," United States Naval Institute 
Proceedings, April 1983, 60-61. In addition to these schemes, 
one of the most novel solutions was the secret plan in the Bureau 
of Ships to build a new class of torpedo-proof ships with an 
inner hull and outer hull, separated by twelve-feet of solid ice, 
which would be maintained at freezing temperature by a shipboard 
refrigeration plant. Naval technicians estimated that a torpedo 
would not be able to penetrate the ice, therefore the ice ship 
would be unsinkable. While this plan rivaled Churchill's 
proposal of constructing airstrips on icebergs in the North 
Atlantic, it never really received serious consideration at the 
highest levels. 
33Ibid. 
Eagle, the Carolyn the u.s.s. Atik, and the Evelyn became the 
u.s.s. Asterion. The Atik and Asterion received four 4-inch 
guns, four so-calibre machine guns, six "K" guns, depth charge 
throwers, and sonar. The Eagle was similarly equipped, except 
that it received one 4-inch gun instead of four. 34 
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Admiral King opposed projects like "LQ," but went along with 
the President's quixotic plans for want of anything better. LQ 
was a disaster. It took the lives of many American seamen. The 
trouble began on 26 March 1942, when the Atik, 300 miles east of 
the Chesapeake Bay, had the misfortune to sail into the sights of 
one of Germany's most successful and resourceful U-boat 
commanders, Reinhard Hardegen, in the U-123. The Atik was the 
first Q-ship to engage an enemy U-boat, and this engagement 
proved to be its last. The Atik and the U-123 crossed paths on 
26 March 1942 at 2037 Eastern War Time. The U-123 torpedoed the 
Atik, which immediately began to lose way. Hardegen, upon seeing 
that it was a small prize, ordered the ship to be finished off by 
gunfire. The Atik maneuvered towards the U-boat and dropped its 
disguise. Hardegen, however, was no novice. He quickly 
submerged and torpedoed the Q-ship. He patiently watched as it 
sank and the crew abandoned ship. None of the 142-man complement 
34samuel Eliot Morison, History of the United States Naval 
Operations in world War II, Vol. 1, The Battle of the Atlantic. 
September 1939--May 1943 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1964), 282-83. 
crew survived the ordeal at sea. The ~ and her men were 
lost. 35 
Five Q-ships were eventually built, but not one managed to 
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sink or even damage a U-boat. on the other hand, they frequently 
got into predicaments and had to be rescued by regular Navy 
forces. Admiral King, like his counterparts in the Royal Navy, 
had had enough. He sounded the death knell for Project LQ in 
September 1943. Despite careful preparations and elaborate 
secrecy, the Q-ships had failed. Samuel Eliot Morison, the 
unofficial United States Navy historian, described them as "the 
least useful and most wasteful of all methods to fight 
submarines. 1136 
Another Navy project for the protection of merchant shipping 
was a kind of rudimentary escort system. Nicknamed the "Bucket 
Brigade," it began on 27 March and consisted of the movement of 
ships from one naval district to another, up and down the 
coastline, under a series of local escorts. Morison stated: 
The Bucket Brigades was the best defensive measure that 
could be put into effect given the paucity of escort 
ships and planes. Ships steamed during daylight hours 
as close to the shore as safety permitted, and at night 
took shelter in a protected anchorage. This system was 
practicable because the Atlantic Coast north of {Cape) 
Hatteras is divided into approximately 120-mile 
stretches between good harbors, which is about the 
maximum run that a slow merchant ship can make during 
daylight. South of Cape Henry, where there were no 
35Gannon, Operation Drumbeat, 323-27. 
36Ibid .. , 330. 
adequate harbors of refuge, the Eastern Sea Frontier 
established net-protected anchorages every 120-miles.n 
Safe anchorages were usually natural coastal shelters such 
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as the Virginia Capes, but south of Virginia the only safe 
harbors were in Charleston, South Carolina and Jacksonville, 
Florida. The Fifth Naval District augmented the anchorages by 
placing a netted anchorage west of Cape Lookout, North Carolina, 
and erecting a mined anchorage southwest of Cape Hatteras, North 
Carolina. such anchorages were excellent locations for damaged 
ships that had to fall out of a convoy. 38 
Once the "Bucket Brigades" went into operation, however, 
serious losses continued. It rapidly became apparent that they 
were not an answer to the U-boats. For the time being, however, 
they were almost all that was available. Actually, the Navy 
augmented them with other operations. In imitation of a British 
operation of 1915, the Navy mobilized small craft--fishing boats, 
yachts, schooners, motorboats, and any other craft that were up 
to the task--as an auxiliary fleet. Officially designated the 
Coastal Picket Patrol, it became known to its personnel, however, 
as the Hooligan Navy because of its civilian and ramshackle 
character. The official Coast Guard title, "Corsair Fleet," was 
little used. 39 
37Morison, Battl·e of the Atlantic, 254-55. 
38Fifth Naval District, "War Record of the Fifth Naval 
District, 1942," 1943, Guide No. 129, p.461, Operational Archives, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
39Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, 268. 
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Rear Admiral Andrews was a proponent of this operation, 
although preliminary attempts at using small craft as 
"antisubmarine lookouts" made it clear that the vessels obtained 
were not able to withstand the rigors of the Atlantic. He 
ordered the district Coast Guard Off ice of the Fifth Naval 
District to assemble as many private yachts as possible. Their 
official status was the Coast Guard Temporary Reserve. 
On the morning of 27 June 1942, the crew of the Diamond 
Shoals witnessed a peculiar wartime sight near the channel 
entrance. What appeared to be a peacetime yachting flotilla, 
consisting of sixteen small yachts ranging in length from 45 to 
65 feet, passed by on their way out to sea for a shakedown 
cruise. The sixteen yachts were assigned to eight stations just 
outside the capes for a 24-hour patrol. Before long, however, 
the smaller craft began straggling back in. The rough, large 
waves outside the Bay were more than a match for them. Many 
never reached their assigned stations. Those that did were 
unable to last out the 24-hour patrol assigned, and by the next 
morning all of them were already in port or en route. These 
vessels were simply not suited for the task. Some were kept for 
inner guard and patrol duty as part of the Local Defense Force; 
the rest were returned to the owners, who were thanked and 
informed that their vessels were deemed unfit for duty. 40 
Rear Admiral Andrews was undeterred by the poor showing of 
the yachts. on 14 July 1942, he ordered the district commandants 
40commandant, "History," 662-63. 
to initiate the plan of the coastal Picket Patrol. The main 
vessels employed were sailing yachts. (Most of the power boats 
suitable for offshore patrol in the Fifth Naval District had 
already been drafted into the service by the Navy or coast 
Guard.) Out of 54 vessels collected, only 23 were eventually 
employed. They were equipped with portable underwater sound 
listening gear and armed with demountable JO-caliber machine 
guns. Depth charges had been considered, but the Navy did not 
want to receive a message on the order of "sighted sub, sank 
self." Only one large schooner in the district was found to be 
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fast enough to drop charges set for 100-feet and get away safely. 
It was the only one so armed. 
The first coastal Picket Patrol began on 7 September 1942 
and patrolled a station thirty miles east of Winter Quarter 
Shoals. In the following months, as many of the prescribed 
stations were patrolled as weather and the availability of craft 
allowed. on 1 December 1942, Admiral Andrews issued a document 
setting forth a remarkable patrol doctrine for the coastal 
pickets. If a picket came into contact with a U-boat, it was 
expected not only to radio its location, but to attack it: 
When an enemy submarine is sighted on the surface, 
close to within your gun range and open machine gun 
fire to clear personnel from the bridge. Prevent his 
crew from manning their guns. Keep your guns ready for 
immediate surface attack at all times. Do not attract 
his attention by firing from too long a range. The 
element of surprise is a major factor in successful 
offensive action.~ 
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Propitiously, by the time this order had been issued, u-
boats had ceased their bold attacks in the areas to be patrolled. 
No yacht ever had the opportunity to engage a U-boat. If one had, 
as outlined above, it would have been suicidal. The yachts' 
toughest battle, however, was not with enemy submarines but with 
mother nature. Numerous cases were cited when the craft were 
missing for days following storms. Some vessels had carrier 
pigeons, and one once reported its location and condition back to 
base. 
Admiral Andrews' Coastal Picket Patrol never really worked. 
The yachts sank no submarines, nor did they engage any. But it 
is impossible to dismiss the patrols entirely. They reported 
numerous sonar contacts, though they led nowhere. Usually by the 
time a regular Navy or Coast Guard warship with sonar arrived, 
the contact had disappeared. Undoubtedly, enemy submarines 
patrolling coastal waters knew about the pickets. Often they may 
have submerged and fled. United States submarines in the Pacific 
theater found Japanese sampans to be a nuisance. The sampans, of 
course, were analogous to the Coastal Picket Patrol vessels. 
American submarines reported that, not knowing how a sampan was 
armed, submarines could not risk remaining on the surface. 
Neither could they afford to give away their position by shelling 
or torpedoing the sampans. The German submarine commanders 
probably had the same reaction. Consequently, the pickets may 
have had some value. overall, however, they lent a touch of 
color to the antisubmarine effort, but that was all. On 9 
November 1943, the Coastal Picket Patrol was officially retired 
and withdrawn from operation. 42 
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Another approach was to use commercial fishing vessels to 
spot enemy submarines and aircraft. Called the Confidential 
Observers Plan, Rear Admiral Andrews initiated it on 7 April 1942 
as an adjunct to the patrol of the Atlantic. Two problems had to 
be solved for it to work. First, fishing boats had to be found 
that could be entrusted with confidential information. Second, 
the boats had to be provided with a means of rapid and secure 
communication. 
By the middle of June 1942, seventeen skippers and crews of 
the offshore fishing vessels had been enlisted and were operating 
under the plan. Eventually, practically every offshore fishing 
vessel was enlisted in the program. In the Fifth Naval District 
alone, 143 vessels were cooperating. Sixty-nine of them were 
equipped with radio telephones by the Navy. Fishing vessels that 
had joined the operation in other districts entered the waters of 
the Fifth Naval District every spring to fish. Thus the number 
of observers grew. 43 
The project was vindicated on at least one occasion. On 13 
April 1942, captain Quinn of the fishing vessel Sea Roamer, 
operating out of Hampton, sighted an enemy submarine and plotted 
its position to be twenty-miles east of Currituck. He reported 
the sighting to the Naval Operations Base in Norfolk. Attack 
42Ibid. I 667-68. 
43Ibid., 669. 
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aircraft were on the scene in less than an hour. The enemy 
submarine, however, had departed the area by this time. While 
the planes failed to locate the U-boat, this incident coming soon 
after the establishment of the fishing pickets, demonstrated the 
value of the plan and contributed to its adoption elsewhere along 
the Eastern Sea Frontier. 44 
Besides the Coastal Picket Patrol and the confidential 
Observers Plan, one other wartime organization gave devoted 
service to the antisubmarine campaign--the Civil Air Patrol. As 
a nation-wide organization, the CAP performed a variety of tasks: 
reconnaissance, fire patrol, rescue work, and air cover for 
convoys. The idea behind it was the same as that behind the 
Coastal Picket Patrol: to mobilize amateurs with private craft 
for patrol and combat duty. Perhaps as many as 100,000 civilian 
pilots of the United States were ineligible for the armed forces 
by reason of age or physical disability, but they could still 
fly, and even more to the advantage of the authorities, they 
supplied their own planes. 45 
compared to the Coastal Picket Patrol, the Civil Air Patrol 
was much more independent. The Coast Guard directed the Picket 
Patrol, but the civil Air Patrol organized, governed, and 
disciplined itself. When the German attack on merchant shipping 
began, the civil Air Patrol volunteered to establish a sea-lane 
44Ibid., 669-70. 
45Louis Keefer, "Fliers on the Home Front," Virginia Cavalcade, 
Winter 1992, 111. 
50 
air patrol base near Atlantic city. That was in late February 
1942, when air coverage along the Eastern Sea Frontier was 
meager, so its services were gladly accepted. At first its 
planes were completely un.armed, serving only for locating U-boats 
or survivors. But as time went on the larger aircraft were armed 
with either a 325-pound depth charge or two 100-pound demolition 
bombs. In the early phases of the battle, however, their 
principal role was to sight damaged vessels, give the location of 
survivors in lifeboats, and report suspicious vessels.~ 
By September 1942, twenty-one Civil Air Patrol bases along 
the nation's Atlantic and Gulf shores, stretching from Bar 
Harbor, Maine, to Corpus Christi, Texas. The only Civil Air 
Patrol base in Virginia was established at Parksley airport on 
Virginia's eastern shore. Like many of the other civil Air 
Patrol airfields, Parksley before renovation was little more than 
a scrubby Accomack County pasture dotted with pine saplings and 
surrounded with deep drainage ditches. 
The airport had been developed originally in the mid-1930s 
by funds granted by the Work Projects Administration (WPA). By 
the time the civil Air Patrol pilots arrived in 1942, the little 
airport had been closed for a time. Also, the field's two 
runways were dangerously short. The NW-SE runway was only 1,600 
feet long. The NE-SW crosswind runway was even shorter. 
Civilian aircraft, while able to operate on small runways, 
generally needed 2,000 feet to get airborne. Yet, despite these 
~orison, Battle of the Atlantic, 276-8. 
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drawbacks, the authorities still decided to use the field because 
of its location, which was about halfway between the civil Air 
Patrol base in Delaware and the one in North Carolina. Finally, 
it offered mostly fog-free flying weather.~ 
The Civil Air Patrol at Parksley had two tasks, convoy 
patrols and beach patrols. convoy flights went out twice a day. 
The dawn patrol left at first light, the afternoon patrol just 
after lunch. The beach patrol, was less frequent. It covered 
the shoreline between Virginia Beach and Rehobeth Beach in 
Delaware, searching for derelict naval mines and spent torpedoes. 
Occasionally, pilots would spot dead bodies floating in the water 
near the shore and would report them to the nearest Coast Guard 
station. 
While the civil Air Patrol regularly used smaller aircraft 
such as Piper Cubs, Taylorcraft, and Aeroncas for a plethora of 
duties not connected with the antisubmarine effort, the coastal 
patrols required heavier and more powerful Fairchilds, Stinsons, 
and Cessnas--aircraft with at least ninety horsepower engines, 
engines powerful enough to carry two men over several hours 
against the ocean winds and weather. Though these aircraft were 
tiny in comparison to their military counterparts, the sight of 
one approaching low over the water caused even the most daring u-
boat commander great concern. Since he could not risk the chance 
of being spotted, he would order a dive before he could recognize 
~Keefer, Fliers on Front, 112-115. 
whether the incoming aircraft was a tiny Cessna or a larger 
military plane. 
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During the nearly fifteen months that Parksley dispatched 
regular patrols, beginning in late 1942, not one ship was sunk in 
its designated area--the same area in which during March 1942 
alone, German U-boats sank 20 vessels. While the submarine 
threat was at its worst--January 1942 through July 1942--Civil 
Air Patrol pilots flew some 86,685 missions. They suffered 
casualties: 90 aircraft were lost, 74 of them at sea, 26 crewmen 
died and 7 were seriously wounded. 41 
The Civil Air Patrol was credited, in total, with spotting 
173 submarines, bombing 57, and sinking or damaging 2, not 
counting those destroyed by the army or navy aircraft they called 
in for assistance. The patrols also reported 91 vessels in need 
of some form of help and were responsible for finding 363 
survivors and recovering 36 corpses from the ocean waters. 
Furthermore, at the special request of the Navy, these patrols 
performed over 5,500 special convoy missions. 49 The dedication 
and heroism of these civilian fliers made a superb contribution 
to the antisubmarine campaign. 
In the summer of 1943, when the Navy took over all aspects 
of antisubmarine warfare, the Civil Air Patrol squadrons were 
assigned other duties. Fishermen and island dwellers were sad at 
the cessation of their flights; they missed the brightly-colored 
48Ibid. , 119. 
49Gannon, operation Drumbeat, 357. 
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one-engine craft with the white pyramid mark. They had become 
accustomed to seeing them during daylight hours, however foul the 
weather. When the war ended, so did most of the civil Air 
Patrol's military-oriented activities. The Parksley airfield 
survived for a time, but finally reverted to farmland in the 
early 1950s, having earned its place in the history of Virginia 
and in the Battle of the Atlantic.~ 
In the winter and spring of 1942, officers of the Fifth 
Naval District and proposed the convoy system. Admiral Simons 
and his fellow commandants, however, unanimously opposed the 
introduction of the system because of the lack of escorts. 51 
They believed that a convoy without adequate protection was worse 
than none at all. on 6 March 1942, King agreed with the 
commandants' analysis, but he urged implementation as soon as 
possible. 
Aid soon came from the convoy-wise British, who in late 
March 1942, lent fourteen 83-foot armed trawlers to the United 
States, four of which were pressed into duty in the Fifth Naval 
District. 52 These vessels went immediately into service. Two 
went out on patrol by as early as 31 March. 
The united states Navy was hardly unacquainted with convoy 
tactics. Though averse to learning from the hard experiences of 
the Royal Navy, it had these experiences to examine. Also it had 
5°Keefer, Fliers on Homefront, 123. 
51Freeman, War Diary, 141-42 • 
52Ibid, I 132. 
the wisdom of its own great seaman of the First World War, 
Admiral W. s. Sims, who had written: 
Our tactics should be such to force the submarine to 
incur this danger(that of encountering the escorts) in 
order to get within range of merchantmen. It, 
therefore, seems to go without question that the only 
course for us to pursue is to revert to the ancient 
practice of convoy. This will be purely an offensive 
action because, if we concentrate our shipping into 
convoy and protect it with our naval forces, we will 
thereby force the enemy, in order to carry out his 
mission, to encounter naval forces • • • we will have 
adopted the essentia.l principle of concentration while 
the enemy will lose it. 53 
In February 1942, however, the sad truth was that the United 
States naval commanders were moving toward the convoy system as 
much out of desperation a.s rational calculation. Navy forces 
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patrolled the sea lanes and hunted the U-boats when they betrayed 
their positions by sinking merchantmen, but results had been 
meager. This method had proven to be futile in World War I, when 
President Wilson referred to it as "hunting the hornets all over 
the farm. 1154 
convoys, as history demonstrates, are the best defense 
against u-boats. The Navy understood through its experience with 
transatlantic convoys, that U-boats would avoid convoys, 
preferring the easy targets, such as single, unescorted cargo 
ships. solitary vessels not only were easier targets; they 
presented a lower risk of retaliation. With undeniable facts 
like these in mind, the Navy gradually overcame its reservations 
53Macintyre, Battle of the Atlantic, 140. 
54Morison, Battle of the Atlantic, 134. 
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based on the small number of ships that were available for escort 
duty.SS 
The convoy system finally went into operation along the east 
coast of the United States on 14 May 1942. On that day, 
Virginia, for the first time, was linked with a regular coastal 
convoy to Key West, Florida. Convoys were extended further north 
and south and were continually reinforced with more and more 
ships and aircraft. The effect was immediately noticeable. The 
number of ship sinkings declined. The month before the convoys 
began, 23 vessels went down in the Eastern Sea Frontier, but in 
May, only 5. The number increased, however, in June, to 13, but 
fell to only 3 in July. The convoy system continued to operate 
throughout 1942 and until the U-boat threat dissipated.~ 
sschief of Naval Operations, "Anti-submarine Warfare in World 
War II: OEG Report No. 51, 11 (Charles M. St.ernhell ar:id Alan M. 
Thorndike), 1946, Guide No. 435, p. 25, Operational Archives, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington, o.c. 
s6Morison, vol. 10, The Battle of the Atlantic Won, May 1943-
-May 1945, 361. The convoy system last7d.until ~8 May 1943 when 
a joint announcement was made by the British Admiralty and the 
United states Navy: "Effective at 20:01 this date, eastern 
standard time (OO:Ol May 29 Greenwich Mean.Time), r:io fur~her 
trade convoys will be sailed. Merchant ships by night will burn 
navigation lights at full brilliancy and need not darken ship." 
CHAPTER IV 
HARBOR DEFENSES 
Prior to America's entry into World War II, both the Army 
and Navy knew that only through cooperating with each other would 
they be able to protect the Chesapeake Bay and the Virginia 
Capes. Neither the Army with its artillery emplacements, nor the 
Navy with its fleets could act effectively alone. Acting 
together, the two services would be able to control the shipping 
traffic in the region, provide an effective system of issuing 
warnings about possible enemy activities, and deliver an 
appropriate retaliatory response. 
The agency of Army-Navy cooperation in harbor defense was 
the Harbor Entrance Command Post (HECP), which came into being in 
the summer of 1941 and was housed in the United States Weather 
Bureau building at Fort Story, Virginia. 1 Both services occupied 
offices in the building and staffed them with liaison officers. 
Their mission was to collect and disseminate information of 
activities in the defensive sector to their respective military 
commands. They coordinated the Army's Harbor Defenses with the 
Navy's Inshore Patrol Forces. The commanders of both the Harbor 
1Fielding L. Tyler, "No Subs in the Bay," The Keeper (Summer 
1992) : 5. 
Defenses and the Inshore Patrol received pertinent information 
from the HECP, enabling them to take prompt action in case of 
hostilities. 2 
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The HECP remained in the U.S. Weather Bureau Building until 
July 1942. Plans for a permanent, underground facility at Fort 
Story had begun as early as 22 April 1941, when the Local Joint 
Planning Committee met and decided to construct a protected 
harbor defense command po·st. The permanent HECP occupied its new 
home in July 1942. In 1943, the facility was further enlarged to 
accommodate the emergency center for the Fifth Naval District 
Commandant and the Navy's command operations. This growth housed 
"Battle station Three," a.n exact replica of the Joint Operations 
Center located at the Naval Operations Base in Norfolk. The 
replica was to be put into use if the Joint Operations Center 
ever fell prey to attack and was destroyed; the emergency center 
would then be immediately activated and combat operations could 
be resumed. 3 
By the end of 1942, the HECP had reached maturity. By this 
time, it had become the home for the joint command post of the 
Harbor Defense commander, the Approach Commander and the Entrance 
Force Commander. Through.out the war, Army and Navy personnel 
manned the HECP around th.e clock, seven days a week, 365 days a 
year. The Army ran its own operations room which allowed it to 
2Richard P. Weinert, Jr. and Col. Robert Arthur, Defender of 
the Chesapeake: The story of Fort Monroe (Annapolis: Leeward 
Publications, 1978), 228. 
3comma.ndant, "History," 536-37. 
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coordinate control of the harbor defenses with the joint command 
of the port entrance. Naval personnel also maintained an 
independent operations room which was the base of operations for 
the Naval Intelligence Unit. HECP had more than 100 men assigned 
to it from both the Army and Navy. Most were "observers, radio 
operators, signalmen, maintenance men, teletype and telephone 
operators, with necessary assisting and supervisory personnel. 114 
The HECP had an impressive arsenal of weapons to deploy in 
its fight against the u-boats (see figure 1). The first was the 
mine field. Richard Weinert and Col. Arthur, authors of Defender 
of the Chesapeake: The Story of Fort Monroe, describe it with 
precision: 
The underwater project provided an outer defense of 
twenty-two groups(nineteen mines each) of controlled 
mines in two fields of two lines each in the main 
channel northeast of Cape Henry, and an inner defense 
of six groups in two lines in the Chesapeake Bay near 
Thimble Shoals Light. Also included was the 365 Navy 
contact mines laid on January 17, 1942, between the tip 
of cape Henry and the north edge of the main channel. 5 
The controlled field was kept "safe" when shipping was 
entering or leaving, but was put on "contact" the rest of the 
time, when any vessel coming in contact with a mine would cause 
it to detonate. The field was placed in this mode whenever the 
harbor defense commander required it, usually at night or under 
conditions of poor visibility. 
4Ibid., 59. 
5weinert, Defender, 228-29. 
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Figure 1. Underwater and Other Fixed Defenses of the Hampton Roads-Chesapeake Bay Area 
as Finally Installed 
Source: Commandant, Fifth Naval District, "History of the Fifth Naval District, 1939-
45 .'' Vol. 2, 1946, Guide No. 112, p. 59. Navy Library, Naval Historical Center, 
Washington, D.C. 
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The second weapon consisted of Army and Navy hydrophones, 
underwater listening devices, put in place in summer 1941, and 
laid to seaward for the surveillance of the Bay entrance at times 
of limited visibility. The Army had seven hydrophones equally 
spaced across the entrance of the Bay from Cape Henry to Cape 
Charles. They were positioned in front of the outer mine field 
as described above. The Navy then had fourteen hydrophones 
approximately s,ooo yards east of the Army's outer mine field and 
hydrophones. Together, the Army and Navy evaluated the incoming 
signals and responded appropriately. 
The third weapon was magnetic loops. Laid in the summer of 
1941, they were a set of underwater cables that could detect the 
magnetic field of a vessel passing overhead. The Navy installed 
three of these east of the their hydrophones, thus forming the 
first line of protection for the entrance to the Chesapeake. 
They roughly paralleled the hydrophones, laid in three sections 
of roughly equal length stretching from Cape Henry to Cape 
Charles. Until late 1943, however, only the southern and 
midsections were in operation. The northern section having not 
been laid yet, consisted of only a mine field. 6 
The fourth weapon was radar. The HECP had control over two 
types, surveillance and fire control radar. Surveillance radar 
permitted observation over all water areas regardless of weather 
conditions. It was installed on the Navy's patrol aircraft as 
well as at the Naval Operations Base at Norfolk. The Army's fire 
6Commandant, "History, 11 59. 
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control radar, similar to the surveillance model, aided in aiming 
the artillery. It covered areas within reach of Army artillery, 
mainly the Army's six-inch batteries located at Forts Monroe, 
John Custis, and story. 7 
The fifth weapon was navy patrols. The watch officer 
despatched the patrols from the Little Creek Base. Patrols 
usually kept on station included the examination vessel, the 
Inner and Outer Guards, and vessels at Nude North and South, 
Sold, Jake and Fair. The. patrols were augmented, however, when 
an enemy U-boat was detected. They were expected to function not 
only as a defensive element, but as an offensive weapon as well, 
with orders to destroy any enemy vessel found in their waters. 
The sixth weapon was naval aircraft, used by HECP as 
supplementary patrols to investigate incidents and to help 
identify any foreign shipping or in case of unrecognizable 
signals. 
All of the above weapons enabled HECP to protect the Bay and 
merchant marine traffic in the region. It gathered and 
distributed intelligence data, operated and maintained military 
communication channels, controlled and deployed mines, and 
operated the port. Furthermore, it was responsible for warning 
ships that were dangerously off course and giving protection to 
convoys. 8 
7Weinert, Defender, 229. 
8Ibid., 235. 
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HECP proved to be invaluable in the fight against the u-
boats, and it was an important organization in the larger picture 
of the Battle of the Atlantic. Proving that the Army and Navy 
could coordinate their actions and their forces, HECP operations 
saved ships and saved lives. 
CHAPTER V 
TB.E GREAT ADVAR'l'AGE 
Towards the end of World War I, German submarines had laid 
some 57 mines along the Atlantic coast from Fire Island in the 
north down to Wimble Shea.ls in the south. They had been laid in 
groups of six or seven off of the entrances to some of America's 
most vital ports and harbors. One field at Cape Henlopen 
threatened merchant traffic using the Delaware Bay, while 
another, placed a few miles to the south and west of Cape 
Charles, Virginia, endangered the entrance to the Chesapeake. 
Seven ships, including a light cruiser and a battleship, were 
sunk or damaged by the mines. What the Germans had done with 
such success in the First World War, some twenty-five years ago, 
they might do again. It was against such a background that 
Admiral Andrews, Commander of the Eastern Sea Frontier, issued 
his directive of 13 June 1942 stating that "every possible effort 
should be made to sweep the approaches to our principal harbors 
and to make exploratory sweeps of our coastal sea lanes. 111 
The great advantage of the mine as compared with other 
weapons is that it does not demand the presence of its intended 
victim at the time of the offensive action. This advantage, 
however, is closely related to its greatest disadvantage; 
countermeasures taken after sowing may make it ineffective. The 
1Freeman, war Diary, 336. 
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great advantage of mine warfare was soon shockingly demonstrated 
in the waters off of the Chesapeake Bay. Its disadvantage would 
not be exploited by the Navy until months later. 
The late winter and early spring of 1942 had been good 
months for the U-boats in American waters. Operating off open 
anchorages and undefended harbors, they enjoyed undreamed of 
successes, sinking 2.5 million tons in six and a half months. 
Targets were so plentiful that it was more often a lack of 
torpedoes than shortage of fuel which forced them to return home. 
Fortunately, as the U-boats' aim became deadlier through the 
months, so too did the attacks by the United States Navy. During 
the month of May, there were only two attacks on merchant ships 
in the waters of the Fifth Naval District--and only one of the 
vessels sank. The enemy apparently decided at this point it must 
change its tactics. It turned to a new weapon not yet used--the 
mine. 2 
In the spring of 1942 the only vessels to use the swept 
channel leading into the Chesapeake Bay or even to know of its 
location were naval vessels. The location of the channel was too 
secret to disseminate to all the vessels operating in the 
district. Even with the initiation of the coastal convoy system 
in May, information about the swept channels was not furnished to 
the commodores of the convoys. This policy changed after the 
tragic events of 15, 16, and 17 June. 3 
2Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 259. 
3commandant, "History," 111. 
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In the early hours 15 June, the commodore of Convoy KN-109, 
in the flagship SS Empire Sapphire, reported that his convoy, 
with its six protecting escort vessels, would reach the entrance 
to the Chesapeake Bay around 1700. At 1650, the 13 ships with 
their six escort vessels reached Cape Henry. No local patrol 
craft were in the vicinity, but on the horizon near the Cape 
Henry sea buoy, two pilot ships were visible. As the commodore 
in the Empire Sapphire brought his convoy closer to the swept 
channel, one of the pilot ships headed towards Lynnhaven Roads. 
The other lay still in the water. Meanwhile, along Virginia 
Beach, six miles away, a summer crowd of bathers, brightly 
colored against the shoreline, had gathered to watch the parade 
of ships as they entered the Bay. 4 
Fifteen hundred yard.s on the starboard beam of the Empire 
Sapphire lay whistle buoy 2CB, painted red and marked in white 
with the characters 2CB. In times of peace, the buoy marked the 
entrance to the Chesapeake Bay. Since the war began it stood at 
one corner of the swept channel that ran from the sea through our 
own mine fields into the waters surrounding the Hampton Roads 
region. The northern end of the channel was Point "XM" at the 
position of the old Chesapeake light ship. From there the 
channel ran southwest to Buoy 2CB, where it turned sharply into 
the Bay at a 90 degree angle. 5 
4Freeman, war Diary, 336. 
5Ibid. 1 337 • 
The commodore of Convoy KN-109 found himself in a fix. He 
was without a bay pilot a.nd without information as to when or 
where one might be expected. Ahead of him, he knew, lay the 
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American mine field. Behind him were ships of the convoy strung 
out single file. They would be an easy target for any submarine 
in the area. At approxiI11.ately 1658, the Commodore slowed to five 
knots, then steered his vessel toward the pilot boat that had 
remained stationary. The convoy proceeded with caution towards 
Cape Henry. 6 
Around 1702 the quiet of the late summer afternoon evening 
was shattered. The fifth. vessel in the 13-ship column, the 
11,615 ton American tanker SS Robert c. Tuttle, laden with 
142,700 barrels of crude oil, hit a mine with her bow. She was 
900 yards west of Buoy 2CB. Looking astern from his flagship, 
the Empire Sapphire, the Commodore of the convoy witnessed the 
Tuttle list sharply to starboard and fell out of column. The 
ship's bow went down in the 54 foot deep water. One crewman was 
killed. The other 46 crewmen were able to escape the ship, which 
had become a blazing wreck. Although severely damaged, the 
vessel was later salvaged along with 72,000 barrels of its oil. 7 
The explosion caused confusion among the other ships in the 
convoy. some captains believed a U-boat had torpedoed the 
7Fifth Naval Distric:t, "War Record," 263; Navy Department, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Summary of Statement of 
Survivors of the SS Robert c. Tuttle," n.d., Operational Archives, 
Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
Tuttle. Eventually the commodore was able to close up the 
formation. The vessels, in rotation, then proceeded to pick up 
Bay pilots for their journey up the Chesapeake. There was one 
exception, the Esso Augusta, a tanker of 11,237 tons laden with 
119,000 barrels of diesel oil. After the explosion in the 
Tuttle, the Augusta broke out of column and hoisted signals for 
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zigzag. For one-half hour it maneuvered in the vicinity of Buoy 
2CB, trying to find a place where it could enter the Chesapeake 
Bay without encountering the American mine field or being 
attacked by the supposed enemy submarine. It reentered the 
convoy column in seventh place. At 1733, however, a mine 
exploded on her starboard quarter, one-half mile due south of 
Buoy 2CB. 8 
Soon after the Tuttle's explosion, escort vessels assisted 
by Navy blimps began to hunt for German submarines. Thousands of 
summer tourists on the beach witnessed the action. (The papers 
subsequently published headlines reading "Battle of Atlantic 
Pushes Virginia's Shores"9 and "Sub Hits Two Merchantmen off the 
Coast. 1110 
8Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 264; Navy Department, 
"Summary of statements by Survivors of the MV Esso Augusta," n.d., 
Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 
9Frank Sullivan, "Battle of Atlantic Pushes Virginia's Shores--
Two Merchant Ships Torpedoed Before Eyes of Thousands Who Line 
Resort Front to See Grim War Drama," The Virginian-Pilot, 17 June 
1942. 
10Irene Pearson, "Sub Hits Two Merchantmen Off the Coast, 46 
Aboard sunk Ship Reach Bas.e--One crewman is Killed," The Portsmouth 
Star, 17 June 1942. 
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Approximately two hours after the first explosion had rocked 
the Robert c. Tuttle, the British Armed Trawler, HMS Kingston 
Ceylonite, of 500 tons, which was on its way up the coast with 
the SS Delisle, which was being towed by the tug Warbler. The 
British trawler struck a mine. The first blast was quickly 
followed by a second, most likely an explosion of the ship's 
magazine. The fierce explosions, on the starboard side 
amidships, blasted the vessel into two tattered sections just 
forward of the bridge. She sank in 2 minutes, 2 miles southwest 
of Buoy 2CB, with only 15 of the 32-man crew surviving. 11 
Believing that an enemy submarine was the culprit, navy 
ships immediately began the hunt. The crew of the destroyer 
Bainbridge, one of the escort vessels with the convoy, thought 
that it had obtained contact with a U-boat. Its sonar had 
probably picked up a wreck on the bottom. In the excitement of 
the moment, however, it laid a pattern of eight depth charges set 
for 50 feet. Minutes later it obtained a second contact and 
again attacked with eight depth charges. Their hasty attack, 
however, made it clear that no submarine was below. There were 
not eight explosions, but nine. The Bainbridge had unwittingly 
exploded an enemy mine. 12 
11Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 265-266; Navy Department, 
"Summary of statements by survivors of HMS Kingston Ceylonite." 
n. d. , Operational Archi VE?s, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 
D.C. 
12Ibid. 
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The Chesapeake Bay entrance was immediately closed to all 
merchant traffic. The Commander of the Inshore Patrol, Fifth 
Naval District, ordered s.weeping operations to commence at 
daylight on 16 June. Six mine sweepers from the Naval Mine 
Warfare School, Yorktown, along with three sweepers from the 
Service Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, joined the sweepers from the 
Local Defense Force at Little Creek, Virginia. On the evening of 
15 June, a conference at the Section Base decided upon methods of 
sweeping and marked out the boundaries of the area to be swept. 
First, sweepers would thoroughly search the regular swept channel 
for any mines. Secondly, they would sweep an area roughly 10 
miles by 7 miles with buoy 2CB at its center. This entire area 
was then divided into three sections labeled A, B, and c. 13 
on 16 June sweepers carried out a complete sweep of the 
regular buoyed channel from Point "A" all the way to Point "XM." 
They found and destroyed five enemy mines in the vicinity of Buoy 
2CB. (See Figure 2}u 
Early the next morning (17 June), Convoy KS-511 left Hampton 
Roads bound for Key West. It had been held back for twenty-four 
hours to allow the sweeping to be completed. Its convoy 
commodore had been given routing instructions that would carry 
him safely through the swept channel. It was the first merchant 
convoy to depart the Virginia Capes via the swept channel. 
Unfortunately, after rounding Buoy 2CB {Point "B" of the swept 
13Freeman, War Diary, 339. 
uFifth Naval District, "War Record," 259. 
Figure 2. 
Source: 
AREA C 
AREA 8 
Areas Swept on 16 June 1942. 
Commander Defense Area Group. "Report of Mine Sweeping 
Operations, 16 June 1942." Fifth Naval District Inshore 
Patrol Section Base. Confidential Report to Commander 
Eastern Sea Frontier, 9 July 1942. 
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channel), the ore carrier SS Santore struck a mine. It was tenth 
in the single column convoy. A vessel of 7,117 tons and carrying 
a cargo of 11,095 tons of coal, it had swung too wide. A mine 
exploded amidships on the port side. The vessel was one and 
three-fourths miles bearing 50 degrees true from Buoy 2CB. It 
immediately began to sink.. The captain gave the order to abandon 
ship, which capsized swiftly and slowly sank beneath the waves. 
The Navy considered salvaging it because the water was only 54 
feet deep where it went down. But the idea was given up. Buoys 
with a red light were put in place over the hulk as a warning to 
the other ships •15 This position was only one-half mile south of 
the swept channel from Point "B" to Point "C," and was in the 
area swept by the mine sweepers the previous day. 16 
The Germans had planted a total of fifteen mines in the 
vicinity of Buoy 2CB. (See figure 3) A total of eleven were 
either swept, struck a ship, or were otherwise destroyed. 
Therefore, four must have drifted, or "walked," as it was 
referred to by the Navy, out of the channel and into the Atlantic 
Ocean. In a period of less than 48 hours, this mine field had 
caused the disruption of coastal shipping. Many men and vessels 
had to be devoted to sweeping operations. Two ships had been 
lost and two more severely damaged. From the enemy's point of 
view, this had been an in.expensive and highly successful 
operation. 
15commandant, "History," 273-76. 
16commandant, "History," 602-03. 
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Still later, in the middle of September, more mines were 
found in the same area. (See figure 4) on 12 September, the YMS 
55 detonated a mine at 1000 yards, bearing 43 degrees true from 
Buoy 2CB. On 13 September, three more mines were found and 
exploded in the following locations: at 3600 yards bearing 311 
degrees true from Buoy 2CB; at 6000 yards bearing 55 degrees; and 
at 7500 yards bearing 59 degrees. Several days later, yet again 
three were destroyed at 4800 yards bearing 9 degrees true; at 
3000 yards bearing 24 degrees true; and finally at 4000 yards 
bearing 15 degrees true from Buoy 2CB. 17 
A study of the periods just preceding the mid-June 
explosions and those in September reveals striking similarities. 
In both instances, the Plot Room of the District Intelligence 
Office suspected an enemy submarine in the area. Also, in both 
cases, a lull in submarine activity occurred. Two weeks after 
the Plot Room lost track of the U-boats, enemy mines were found 
in the area around Buoy 2CB. Also both periods were at the time 
of a new moon when nights were darkest and visibility lowest. 18 
In September, certain unidentifiable green flares were 
observed just outside of the buoyed channel off Cape Henry on 1, 
2, a, and 13 September. These flares had probably been fired by 
an enemy U-boat to draw patrol vessels away from the swept 
channel and thus enabling it to enter the area and lay mines. 
17Fifth Naval District, "War Record," 260-61. 
18Ibid, 
Figure 4. 
Source: 
Mines Found and Exploded in June and September 1942. 
Fifth Naval District, "War Record of the Fifth Naval District, 1942." 
1943, Guide No. 129, p. 262. Operational Archives, Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, o.c. 
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The Fifth Naval District also suspected enemy minelaying 
activity in the area surrounding Lookout Bight, where the 
periscope of a submarine was reported on 27 September. A 
submarine had laid mines in the harbor at Charleston, South 
Carolina, and was tracked northward into the waters of the Fifth 
Naval District. After a few days in the vicinity of Lookout 
Bight, it was reported returning eastward without having laid any 
mines. 19 Careful surveillance by the Fifth Naval District had 
paid off. 
The enemy attempted to repeat the successes of June, but the 
United States Navy had learned from the tragedy of that month. 
From that time not a single merchantman would be lost to mines in 
the waters of the Fifth Naval District. 
~Ibid. 
CHAPTER VI 
A GERMAN U-BOAT M:CSSION TO MINE THE VIRGINIA CAPES 
As Tidewater residents went to bed the night of 12 June 
1942, war dominated their thoughts and dreams, but a war presumed 
far from the shores of Virginia Beach. Battle reports from the 
clash at Midway gave hope that the tide was now turning in the 
Pacific even as the Japanese commenced their attack on the remote 
Aleutian Islands; Germany was planning to fight on two fronts in 
the Soviet Union, a year after its blitzkrieg invasion; and 
executions continued throughout Czechoslovakia in reprisal for 
the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. 1 But that night, the war 
would come home to the residents of the Hampton Roads region, as 
a German U-boat secretly laid mines in the waters nearby that 
would cause the destruction of 15, 16 and 17 June. 
One month earlier, on 19 May 1942, the U-701 or "U-Degen," 
named after the commanding officer Horst Degen, as was common in 
the submarine arm, had left Lorient, France, for the east coast 
of the United states. 2 There it was to carry out a very special 
order: to lay mines in the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay, the 
doorstep of the Norfolk naval base and of the Newport News 
1Ed Offley, "Chesapeake Bay Mined--War Came Close to Home," 
The Norfolk Virginian Pilot and The Ledger Star, 8 July 1982, Al. 
2Headquarters, Fifth Naval District. "Prisoner-of-War 
Information Obtained from Seven Male German Prisoners-of-War 
captured July 9, 1942." 14 July 1942, p. 2. Operational 
Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington D.C. 
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merchant port. Documents surrendered after V-E Day revealed that 
Captain Degen, was the one responsible for mining the Virginia 
Capes. 3 
Degen was 29 years old at the time of the mission. He 
belonged to the naval academy class of 1933, in company with some 
of Germany's most successful U-boat commanders. Prior to the 
outbreak of World War II, Degen had served aboard destroyers. 
When hostilities began he participated in the Norwegian campaign 
aboard the Hans Lody. His ship was in company with the 
Scharnhorst when she sank the HMS Glorious on 8 June 1940. 
Shortly thereafter, Degen. transferred to the U-boat arm. He 
served aboard the U-552 under Erich Topp, one of Germany's most 
successful U-boat commanders at the time. Topp, it seemed, had a 
fatalistic view about U-boat warfare: "Either you ar lucky or you 
aren't. Its no good being overcautious if you want to be 
successful. 114 Degen further reported that Topp "taught me all 
that I know about U-boat warfare. "5 The experience with Topp 
produced in Degen a daring and recklessness which were common 
attributes of successful U-boat commanders. Topp's method was to 
retain the offensive and take little evasive action. 
3commandant, "History of the Fifth Naval District, 1939-
45." vol. 2, 1946, Guide no. 112, p. 227. Navy Library, Naval 
Historical Center, Washington o.c. 
4Navy Department, Office of Naval Operations, "Report on the 
Interrogation of survivors of U-701 Sunk by U.S. Army Attack 
Bomber Number 9-29-322, Unit 296 B.S. on July 7, 1942." n.d. p. 
431. Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, 
D.C. 
5Ibid., 432. 
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Following Degen's tutelage under Topp, he was given command 
of his own U-boat. The U-701 was one of many Type VIIC 
submarines that would be built throughout the course of the war. 
The Type VII was a small boat by American standards, displacing 
769 tons surfaced and 871 tons submerged, and measuring 66.5 from 
stern to stern. Its hull was oval, 6.20 meters high and 4.74 
meters wide. Its pressure hull allowed it to dive to 150 meters 
and beyond. It could survive any depth charge explosions except 
direct hits. It had a crew of forty-four men, including four 
officers. The Type VII was a quick diver; with a good crew it 
could slide beneath the surface in only 25 seconds. 6 
Two powerful diesel engines producing between 2,800 and 
3,200 horsepower ran the Type VII. Its top surface speed was 
17.6 knots. Electronic m.otors for underwater propulsion produced 
750 horsepower, which allowed for a submerged speed of slightly 
over seven knots. Range on the surface depended upon speed, 
either 3,250 miles at seventeen knots or 8,500 miles at ten 
knots. Submerged, however, it was slow and had little stamina. 
The Type VII could either travel 130 miles at two knots or 60 
miles at four knots. 7 
The arsenal was varied. A Type VII carried fourteen 21-inch 
torpedoes, fired from either four tubes in the bow or one in the 
stern. The U-boat carried twelve of the electric torpedoes and 
two of the air compressed. torpedoes. In addition, a Type VII 
6Bagnasco, Submarinef; of World War II, 65. 
7Ibid. 
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also carried an 8.8 cm deck gun, which was used for the shelling 
of ships, and a 2 cm anti-aircraft gun for protection against 
sub-hunting aircraft. 8 
The U-701 was commissioned on 16 July 1941 and placed in the 
charge of Captain Degen of the Third U-boat Flotilla. Degen 
undertook two unproductive war cruises in the U-701 in the North 
Sea before the Virginia assignment. In early May 1942, Degen was 
summoned to Admiral Doenitz's headquarters in Lorient where Degen 
was informed of plans to land German agents on American soil. 
The U-701 was to take such a team of agents to Ponte Vedra beach, 
near Jacksonville, Florid.a. The U-701 was laid up in the ship 
yards at Brest, however, and was unable to meet the deadline for 
the operation, which was timed for the night of 13 June, when 
there would be a new moon and minimum light. Instead, Doenitz 
selected the U-701 to close off the shipping lanes at the mouth 
of the Chesapeake Bay with mines. 9 
Leaving Lorient, France, on 20 May 1942, Captain Degen made 
a dash across the Bay of Biscay in order to elude British 
aircraft or ships. Degen, in fact, had been given orders to 
avoid contact with all vessels to insure that he delivered the 
mines to the doorstep of Uncle Sam's very own house. In the five 
8Ibid., 144. 
90ffle.y, 8 July 1982. 
torpedo tubes lay fifteen magnetic-ground mines, three in each 
tube, the diameter of each roughly that of a torpedo. 10 
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Degen pushed westward and encountered little surface 
traffic; the only vessels the crew of the U-701 observed were a 
port tug, a fishing vessel bound for Newfoundland and the neutral 
Swedish liner Gripsholm, which was in the service of the 
International Red Cross. Degen recalled the passage across the 
Atlantic in his memoirs: 
Day by day we came nearer to the American coast, we 
went slow but steady without any excitement, the spirit 
on board was good although one would think that it was 
boring. The watches on the bridge and in the engine-
rooms went on regula.rly, the crew had good food and 
good entertainment by records being played in the 
wireless-room over loudspeakers throughout the whole 
ship, and when we were approaching the American coast 
there was also the United State's radio stations giving 
us the latest news a.nd musical programs not knowing 
whom they were entertaining. 11 
The U-Degen arrived off Virginia's shores during the day of 
11 June. Degen had received orders to get as close to the 
Chesapeake Bay entrance a.s possible and then lie there. His 
officers were then to plo·t the American minefield's location by 
monitoring the traffic routes of the incoming and outgoing 
vessels. If the U-boat proceeded with this plan, the U-701 would 
have to lie on the bottom at a depth of approximately 36-feet. 
The threat of aerial reconnaissance and the pure chance of being 
discovered by a passing vessel prompted Degen and the officers to 
•°Horst Degen. Letter from Luxembourg to Mr. I.M. Punnet and 
Mr. Anthony Hancox in Birmingham, England, 14 November 1965. 3. 
11Ibid.' 4. 
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disregard their orders, a.nd lay mines without locating the 
American minefields beforehand, a very risky venture. Degen 
explained, 11 36 feet of depth is no proposition for a submarine 
that had just crossed the Atlantic!! One could as well have put 
her (U-701) in an aquarium for easily catching her. 1112 
Degen held a day-long conference with his officers: Konrad 
Junker, the executive officer; Karl Heinrich Bahr, the engineer; 
Gunter Kunert, the naviga.tor; and the junior watch officers 
Bazies and Lange. After studying charts of the Bay, they 
concluded that there was only one way into it: between Cape Henry 
and Cape Charles. The ch.arts showed a bank coming down from Cape 
Charles. Incoming ships had to round the shallows at the 
southern tip and enter the Bay in a single file between Cape 
Henry and the bank on a northern course. Degen and his officers 
decided that this would be the best place to lay their mines.u 
They agreed to lay the mines at night while moving swiftly 
on the surface. Laying m.ines was simple for the U-701. The five 
torpedo tubes were to be filled with water, and then the outer 
torpedo doors were opened. Each mine was kept in place by a 
special trigger, which withdrew the moment it was to be released. 
The boat released mines a.t set intervals as it moved, providing 
an equal distance between. the mines. They lay inactive for 60 
hours before an internal chronometer armed them. It ensured that 
the mine-laying vessel would be well clear of the area and not be 
12Ibid., 5. 
130ff ley, a July, 1. 
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endangered by its own "eggs," when they became active. Any ship 
that passed over the active mine would discharge it. No direct 
contact was required as the metal of the ships hull tripped a 
magnetic sensor in the mine; the explosion was timed so that it 
would occur under the keel and cause maximum damage. 
At nightfall on 12 June 1942, the U-701 with its deadly 
cargo crept in over the outer Continental Shelf toward the 
Virginia Beach shoreline. Degen recalled, 
On port we could see the dark shadows of dunes, lights 
here and there and a.s our course brought us by closer 
to the very beach be:low Cape Henry it was a 
breathtaking adventure to see even cars and persons and 
lighted houses. 14 
To the amazement of the crew it appeared that their target was 
clearly illuminated and undefended. Captain Degen and the U-701 
proceeded toward shore using the lighthouses, which were lit. 
They entered the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay and reached Thimble 
Shoals. There they laid their lethal minefield. (See figure 5.) 
The operation was uneventful until an armed American trawler 
appeared in the channel. Degen wrote in his memoirs the 
following, "· •• things began to happen." 15 The trawler 
appeared right in the middle of the shipping lane running without 
lights, and it was cutting a path across the bow of the U-boat 
from port to starboard. 
Discovery of the U-701 by the patrol boat would mean either 
destruction, or even worse, capture. Degen had no choice but to 
14Degen, Letter, 8 • 
15Ibid. 
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continue with the mission and hope that his boat would not be 
discovered. The U-701 crept on. A turn would have shown the 
profile of the U-boat to the patrol vessel. The two vessels 
approached each other at right angles then diverged. The patrol 
ship continued on its rou.te toward Cape Charles. The Cape Henry 
lighthouse neared on the port bow of the U-701, then passed 
slowly on the port side. When the lighthouse reached a 
predetermined point, Degen gave the order to begin the mine-
laying. Zig-zagging back and forth, the U-701 expelled one mine 
each 60 seconds into the dark water of the Bay. 16 
At the halfway mark, the crew of the U-701 observed the same 
trawler returning on the track that it had taken previously 
across the Bay entrance. The crew had to shut down the diesel 
engines, choking off their "blub, blub, blub" sound. The U-701 
lay quiet in the water until the "doorkeeper of the Chesapeake 
had reached the other sid.e of its assigned route. 1117 The mining 
operation began anew, but instead of running on its diesel 
engines, the U-701 operated on its electric batteries, 
guaranteeing silence as it finished its secretive mission. 18 
Degen and the U-701 proceeded to sneak in behind the trawler's 
wake and followed it while they finished the dispersion of mines. 
By 0200 the job was complete. Degen recalled in his memoirs, "We 
had a feeling that the mines were laid just on the right position 
16Ibid, 9. 
17Ibid. 
18Ibid. 
since the patrol boat had. shown us where she was guarding and 
which way we should not trespass. 11 19 
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Less than an hour had passed since Degen and his gallant 
crew had entered the shipping channel. The U-701 had avoided 
detection and its deadly weapons now lay waiting for their first 
victim, the timers silently marking off sixty hours before 
activating their magnetic and acoustic detonators. Deployment 
had been completed in the early hours of 13 June. Therefore, the 
mines armed themselves at approximately 1400 on 15 June 1942. 
The mines were active for little more than three hours before 
they drew first blood. A.s described in the previous chapter, a 
convoy entering the Hampton Roads region from Key West, Florida, 
on 15 June entered the minefield. Ships hit mines, and the Bay 
had to be closed for two days. The detonations caused a furor. 
Thousands of summer vacationers watched from the shores of 
Virginia Beach as the convoy struggled across the minefield. 
Shock waves from the explosions rattled windows on shore. 20 
The shock waves not only rattled windows, but also roused 
the Army and Navy into action. The former immediately stepped up 
its defensive role on the mid-Atlantic seaboard by transferring 
19Degen, Letter, 10. 
2ooffley, a July, A4. The U-701, however, was not alone in 
its assault at the shoreline of the United States. Mining 
operations by other German U-boats in the summer of 1942 also 
occurred at Boston, the Delaware Bay approaches, Charleston 
harbor, Jacksonville and the Mississippi River passes. By and 
large, however, the mining operations were a failure. The mines 
that were dropped in the other harbors sank no ships and did no 
damage to any vessel. Degen's penetration of the mouth of the 
Chesapeake was the only mission that claimed any victims. 
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the 396th Medium Bombardm.ent Squadron in California to the Marine 
Corps air station at Cherry Point, North Carolina. 
The 396th, with thirteen A-29 Bombers, flew six sorties a 
day: three southbound and three northbound flights out along the 
North Carolina coast, covering the shipping routes from Cape 
Hatteras south to Charleston, South Carolina. The first patrols 
departed an hour before sunrise and the last patrol returned an 
hour after sunset, covering the 15-hour span of summer daylight. 
Among the pilots of the 396th was Harry Kane, who arrived 
with his crew for tempora.ry duty at Cherry Point, following the 
cross-country flight from. California. Kane and his crew quickly 
adapted to the routine of his new east coast duty. But the 
flying was tedious. Kane. and his crew flew for hours each day 
and seldom saw any signs of life at sea. On 7 July 1942, 
however, Kane and his bom.ber attacked and sank the "U-Degen. 1121 
In the three weeks following the mining of the Chesapeake 
Bay, the u-701 had had mixed results in its torpedo attacks 
against shipping traffic on the North Carolina coast. Following 
the mining operation, it had been ordered to look for targets for 
its torpedoes in an area which extended from 15 miles south of 
cape Lookout to Chesapeake Light. It entered the broad curve of 
Onslow Bay, North Carolin.a. Degen hoped he would come upon ships 
anchored in the shallows, but all he found were four rusting 
hulks, the trophies of the previous U-boat commanders who had 
21 Ibid, 
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hunted in this region. Degen and the U-701 then proceeded out 
into deeper waters and no·rthwards near Cape Hatteras. The U-701 
attacked and sunk a Coast Guard patrol craft, the YP-389, on the 
night of 19 June. It had. little luck during the next eight days, 
but on 27 June, Degen was able to outsmart two navy destroyer 
escorts to torpedo the ta.nker SS British Freedom as it steamed 
south. 22 
The following day, 28 June, the U-701 sank the tanker SS 
William Rockefeller, despite an escort of two Coast Guard cutters 
and three aircraft. So far on its third war cruise, the boat had 
sunk four ships and damaged three others. Little did the crew 
know that their tally was complete. For the next ten days, the 
U-701 wandered fruitlessly in search of another victim.n 
At dawn on 7 July 1942, the U-701 submerged after yet 
another night of unsuccessful hunting to hide on the bottom. 
That same morning, Harry Kane lifted his Army A-29 Bomber from 
Cherry Point Airfield and. set out on what he thought would be 
another routine mission. 24· Nothing of special interest developed 
at first. After about four hours of uneventful flight, crew 
members concluded it would be another boring mission. But before 
22Fifth Naval District, 
Chesapeake Group, " n. d. , 4. 2 6. 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
"War Diary--Eastern Sea Frontier, 
Naval Historical Center, Operational 
~Office of Naval Operations, 425. The other members of the 
crew that day consisted of the following: 2nd Lt. Murray, 
navigator· c. E. Bellamy, Cpl, bombardier; L. P. Flowers, Cpl, 
I • 
radio; and P. L. Broussard, Cpl, engineer. 
the last minute of the fourth hour had passed, Lieutenant Kane 
spotted something on the surface in the distance. 
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That day, Degen and the crew of the U-701 had been lying on 
the bottom of the Atlantic. The heat had turned the dank 
interior of the U-boat in.to a sauna. The crew was drowsy and 
lethargic because of the stale air and the submarine's continuous 
wallowing motions. In th.e early afternoon, Degen decided to risk 
being spotted to obtain fresh air. Upon surfacing he posted 
lookouts to scan the horizons for aircraft. He was standing on 
the conning tower platform when word came from engineering that 
the boat was fully ventilated. He had already given the order to 
dive when his executive officer cried aloud, "Airplane, 200 
degrees, coming in from port-aft!!"25 The U-boat began to 
submerge, but before the hatch slammed shut, he caught a glimpse 
of the two-engine Hudson bomber dashing down from the clouds. 
The U-701 raced for the safety of the deep. As it dove, Degen 
looked at his executive officer and stated "You saw it too late!" 
and the officer replied in a hushed tone, "Yes."~ 
It was 1412 by the bomber's clock when Kane spotted the 
object approximately seven to ten miles off his port wing. 
Convinced it was a submarine running with decks awash, he 
immediately dove towards it. He realized that he had only one 
chance to hit the U-boat, and it was coming up fast. As the A-29 
25Degen, Letter, 11. 
26Ed Offley, "Confrontation in the Atlantic--The Death of u-
701." ,The Norfolk Virginian-Pilot and the Ledger-Star, 9 July 
1982, Al. 
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reached the swirling waves where the U-boat had been just seconds 
before, he ordered all three 325-pound depth charges dropped. 
The bombs fell to the water, in train; the first fell 25 feet 
short, the second 100 feet further on, and the third 50 feet 
beyond the second. Both the second and third depth charges 
straddled the U-boat and detonated at fifty-feet below the 
surface, in effect a direct hit.n 
Within seconds of the explosion, water began to fill the 
interior of the U-boat. In 30 seconds, the water level had risen 
to within a foot of the hatches. Degen ordered abandon ship and 
wrestled the conning tower hatch open. Immediately, the crewmen 
in the conning tower were thrust out of the U-boat like a cork 
out of a champagne bottle. They rode the bubbles to the surface 
some 200 feet above their heads. 28 
Degen reached the surface alive and conscious. He soon 
discovered that seventeen. others of his crew had escaped. 
Knowing that the Americans had the position of the sinking, he 
believed that they would be rescued within hours. He was wrong. 
Forty-eight hours passed before U-70l's survivors were picked up 
by a coast guard Catalina.. Of the original eighteen men, only 
seven survived, Degen amo·ng them. Their part in the war was 
over. He and his fellows spent the rest of the war in prisoner-
of-war camps. 
noffice of Naval Operations, 425. 
28Degen, Letter, 11. 
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Kane was not sure he had hit his target. He reported the 
sinking soon after return.ing to Cherry Point, but to his chagrin 
found that no one believed his account. Four days later, 
however, Kane and his crew were ordered to Norfolk Naval Air 
Station, where, for the first time, they met Captain Degen and 
the other survivors of th.e U-701. 29 
Although Captain Degen spoke freely about the ships he had 
sunk, he remained quiet a.bout his first mission in Fifth Naval 
District waters. Only after the war did German Admiralty 
documents reveal Degen's responsibility for the mining of the 
Hampton Roads area on the night of 12 June 1942. 
The sinking of the U-701 all but ended the presence of the 
enemy in the waters of th.e Fifth Naval District. Air patrols 
like these in which Kane took part coupled with all other 
countermeasures, mainly the convoy system, forced the German 
Admiralty to seek out 0th.er operating areas for its U-boats. 
Submarines largely disappeared from the waters of the Fifth Naval 
District. Their offensive had come to an end. 
29commandant, "History," 227. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Through the employment of convoys, underwater defenses, and 
air and sea patrols and new weapons, the waters off of Virginia 
Beach became an unprofita.ble and dangerous hunting ground for the 
German U-boats by the second half of 1942. When the United 
States became involved in. World War II many of these defenses, 
although planned, had not been put into operation. The result 
was a staggering, though temporary loss of shipping and lives as 
the U-boats operated freely with little fear of reprisal. In 
Operation Drumbeat, historian Michael Gannon referred to this 
catastrophe as the "Atlantic Pearl Harbor." Gannon criticized 
the United States Navy for failing to respond adequately to the 
threat even after the British intelligence had informed us that 
the U-boats were making their way to the east coast. Some of his 
charges are justified, bu.t this thesis seeks to put the 
antisubmarine war in perspective. The raising of such 
complicated defenses was a large and time-consuming undertaking. 
Resources were scarce. A process of trial and error had to take 
place. The damage done by the U-boats was great, but eventually 
the Navy and other organizations were able to respond 
effectively, establishing a defensive network that repulsed the 
German U-boats within months after they appeared off the shores 
of America. This work has documented the development of this 
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network off the coasts of Virginia. The concluding chapter will 
put the efforts of the Fifth Naval District and other agencies of 
Virginia into the context of the larger war. 
The graphs on the following pages summarize the U-boat war 
off Virginia's coasts. 'I'he striped line indicates U-boat 
activity within the waters of the Fifth Naval District. The 
solid white line shows attacks on enemy submarines. The graphs 
illustrate a week by week reporting of this activity for the 
entire year of 1942. It is apparent that a sharp peak of 
activity was reached in the third week of January when the first 
wave of U-boats reached the American coast to begin Operation 
Paukenschlag. In the following month, activity subsided as most 
U-boats returned to their bases in France. They returned in 
force in March, inflicting heavy losses on the merchant fleet, 
especially during the third week, when the hunters claimed 
thirteen victims. Since few American vessels were available for 
the patrol and district convoys just beginning, the German 
marauders operated with impunity. But U-boat successes began to 
drop significantly in the last days of March as defensive 
measures took hold. This pattern continued with an increase only 
occurring in June, when U-701 laid its mines. In July, only 
three ships were attacked.. Indeed, they were the last three 
vessels to suffer attacks in 1942. 1 
Attacks on the enemy in some respects mirror those of the 
enemy on shipping. The figures in fact, demonstrate a vigorous 
1Fifth. Naval District, "War Record," a. 
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defensive response to the U-boats. The steady completion of the 
region's defenses can be observed beginning in April, when the 
number of American attacks on U-boats exceeded the German ones on 
the merchant fleet. Attacks on U-boats from April until the end 
of the year continued to exceed U-boat attacks. In Virginia 
waters the U-boats had lo·st the offensive by the summer of 1942 
and they would never regain it. 2 
The grand admiral of the underwater fleet, Karl Doenitz, 
noted in his memoirs the change in the hunting conditions in the 
middle of 1942: 
U-boat operations off the east coast of America struck 
a bad patch, from the end of April to the middle of 
May, in which seas were empty of shipping and successes 
were meager. 3 
He attributed this decline to the introduction of convoys, which 
he was right to consider a turning point in the German campaign. 
With the loss of several key U-boat captains and their crews in 
July, he decided that the time had come for him to withdraw most 
of the U-boats from America's shores. 4 A few U-boats continued 
to hunt off of the coast, but the Battle of the Atlantic was over 
for the ships that sailed in the waters of the Fifth Naval 
District. As a result, he began to focus his U-boats on the 
shipping lanes of the Caribbean. Even there successes began to 
decline by the end of June with the gradual introduction of a 
3Doenitz, Memoirs, 220. 
4Ibid., 250. 
convoy system. Therefore, he was forced to return to mid-
Atlantic wolf-pack tactics at the end of 1942. 5 
For the remainder of the war, Allied aircraft covering the 
mid-Atlantic convoys kept U-boats on the defensive and made 
attacks on any convoy fraught with risk for the attacker. In 
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every region in which the U-boats hunted, aircraft were a 
constant threat. 6 Doenit:~ observed that in conjunction with the 
convoys along America's coast, air and surface attacks on U-boats 
continued to increase in the latter part of 1942 and after. 7 
On the eve of the first anniversary of Pearl Harbor, 
Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox issued a submarine warfare 
summary for 1942. A full report on the Pearl Harbor raid 
appeared at the same time and overshadowed it. Buried in the 
back pages of most papers, it acknowledged the loss of 584 Allied 
and neutral merchant vessels in the Western Atlantic amounting to 
close to three million tons. Of this amount, 587,951 tons were 
lost in the Eastern Sea Frontier. The number of American vessels 
lost came to over 300. 8 
Doenitz believed that the course of the war could have been 
dramatically different had Germany been able to produce U-boats 
in the numbers that he wanted. Luckily for the Allies, Germany 
5Ibid. 1 221-22 • 
6Ibid. I 242. 
7Ibid. 
8Theodore Taylor, Fire on the Beaches (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company Inc., 1958), 222. 
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fought World War II without sufficient U-boat numbers and it lost 
the advantage and the offensive in 1942. 9 
Near the close of the war, plans were formed to employ a u-
boat armada against America's east coast. This plan died as 
Germany collapsed and Hitler committed suicide in April 1945. 
Ironically, Doenitz becaltl.e the one to call a final end to the u-
boat campaign. He became head of government after Hitler's 
death. On 4 May 1945 he signalled his boats to cease hostilities 
by issuing the following Order of the Day: 
My U-boat men, six years of U-boat warfare lies behind 
us. You have fought like lions. A crushing 
superiority has compressed us into a very narrow area. 
The continuation of the struggle is impossible from the 
bases which remain. Unbroken in your warlike courage, 
you are laying down your arms after a heroic fight 
which knows no equal. In reverent memory we think of 
our comrades who have died. Comrades, maintain in the 
future your U-boat spirit with which you have fought 
most bravely and unflinching during the long years10 
In the early hours of 7 May 1945, Doenitz's representatives 
signed the surrender papers at Rheims. The Allied powers ordered 
him to signal the capitulation to all submarines at sea. U-boats 
were to surface, hoist black flags, report in plain language 
their positions and proceed to designated ports. One by one, the 
U-boats emerged from the depths, a defeated but proud enemy 
obeying one final order from their commander. Within a month, a 
total of 49 U-boats had surrendered at sea, while another 211 
were scuttled, mostly in the Baltic, to avoid being captured. Of 
9Doenitz, Memoirs, 333. 
10Cmdr. Richard Compton-Hall, The Underwater War, 1939-1945 
(Dorset: Blandford Press, 1982), 105. 
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the former, seven of them. did so in the western Atlantic to the 
United states Fleet. 11 
The U-boat campaign was finally over. With some assistance 
from the Italians, Germany's submarines had sunk over 2,500 
Allied and neutral merchant ships, totaling 14,687,231 tons. In 
addition, 158 British and. 29 U.S. warships had been sent to the 
bottom by U-boat attacks. Almost 30,000 men of the British 
Merchant Marine had perished as well as 5,579 American merchant 
sailors and officers. The American toll represented a higher 
ratio of dead in comparison to the total numbers of merchant 
seamen involved than the ratio of military and naval casualties 
suffered by armed forces the two nations combined. 12 
Germany's Operation Paukenschlag had been silenced in 1942. 
It was of course only a part of the submarine war. Approximately 
820 U-boats participated in the larger Battle of the Atlantic, of 
which only 39 returned to German harbors unharmed at the end of 
the war. Furthermore, of the approximately 40,000 German sailors 
who went to sea in the U-boats, 30,000 perished. 13 These men, 
sometimes little more than boys, suffered the horror of being 
depth charged and facing death within a stench-ridden U-boat. 
Their screams silenced by the sea and their tombs were the boats 
11commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Vol. 1, 1946. 
Guide No. 138, pp. 766-67. Navy Library, Naval Historical 
Center, Washington, D.C. 
12Taylor, Fire, 233. 
13Peter Cremer, U-boat Commander: A Periscope View of the 
Battle of the Atlantic trans. by Lawrence Wilson (Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 1984), xi. 
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on which they served. There would be no funeral processions and 
no gun salutes. The crews rest forever in their iron coffins on 
the bed of the sea. There they joined the many, many victims of 
their attacks. 14 
14Herbert A. Werner. 
1978). 
Iron Coffins (New York: Bantam Books, 
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REPORT OF THE MINE SWEEPING OPERATIONS, 16 JUNE 1942 
Source: Virginia Beach Lifesaving Museum 
CONFIDENTIAL 
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To: 
Via: 
Subject: 
1942 
FIJ~TH NAVAL DISTRICT 
INSHORE PATROL 
SECTION BASE 
LIT~l'LE CREEK, VIRGINIA 
9 July 1942 
Command.er Defense Area Group. 
Command.er Eastern Sea Frontier. 
Command.er Inshore Patrol 
Report of Mine Sweeping Operations, 16 June 
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References: (a)CIP conf. memo. SS-1(1S)/NN4-5ND over(LPT: 
Enclosure: 
BW) to Commanding Officer, Section Base, Little 
Creek, Virginia, dated 2 July 1942. 
(A) Photostats of overlay of Chart #1222. 
1. In reference (a) Commander Inshore Patrol 
directed the Commanding Officer, Section Base, Little Creek, 
Virginia to submit a report of mine sweeping operations 
subsequent to and by reason of, enemy mine discovered on 15 June 
1942. 
2. At approximately 1900, 15 June 1942, Commander 
Inshore Patrol notified Commanding Officer, Section Base, Little 
creek, that ships had been reported sunk in the vicinity of Buoy 
2CB (Chesapeake Bay Entrance) and directed that maximum mine 
sweeping operations be conducted at daylight 16 June 1942. 
Commander Inshore Patrol further informed Commanding Officer, 
Section Base, that sweepe.rs from the Naval Mine Warf are School, 
Yorktown, Virginia, and the Service Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, 
would receive orders to report immediately to Section Base, 
Little Creek. 
3. The following sweepers of the Local Defense 
Forces were available at the time at Section Base, Little Creek, 
Virginia: u.s.s. YMS-55, u.s.s. YMS-57, U.S. SECURITY and U.S. 
AGGRESSOR. Lieutenant Hartwell Pond, USNR, Commanding Officer, 
u.s.s. YMS-55 was Senior Officer Present Afloat. 
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4. The following vessels were available at Naval 
Mine Warfare School, York.town, and received orders to report to 
the Senior Officer Presen.t Afloat upon arrival at Section Base, 
Little Creek: U.S.S. YMS-21, U.S.S. BULLFINCH, U.S.S. CARDINAL, 
u.s.s. HUMMINGBIRD, u.s.s. MOCKINGBIRD and u.s.s. YMS-54. These 
vessels arrived at Section Base, Little Creek, at 1000, 16 June 
1942. 
5. The following vessels of the Service Squadron, 
Atlantic Fleet, also received orders to report to Little Creek 
and arrived during foreno·on 16 June 1942: u.s.s. FLICKER, u.s.s. 
BLUEBIRD and u.s.s. LINNET. 
6. Conference was held by Commanding Officer, 
Section Base, Little Creek, on the evening of 15 June 1942 and it 
was decided to conduct a sweep of the regular buoyed swept 
channel with the vessels of the Service Squadron, Atlantic Fleet, 
as soon as they had reported from point Affirm to point X-Ray 
Mike. It was also decided to make an "area" sweep in the 
vicinity of Buoy 2CB. Th.is area sweep was divided into three 
sub-divisions, shown on enclosure "A" as areas A, B and c. It 
was determined to sweep a.rea A with the Little Creek sweepers and 
to expand the sweeping operations to areas B and c as soon as 
sweepers from Yorktown re:ported to the Senior Officer Present 
Afloat on the scene. 
7. At 0427, 16 June 1942, the YMS-55, YMS-57, 
SECURITY and AGGRESSOR got underway from Little Creek and at 0619 
commenced sweeping at point Affirm See enclosure "A"). Ships 
began sweeping in pairs with magnetic gear with opposite polarity 
on each pulse. Sweep current was 2500 - 2700 amperes at 200 -
210 volts. Pulse period was 5 seconds on 25 seconds off. Speed 
of advance through water 9 knots. SECURITY and YMS-57 were using 
acoustic hammers and the YMS~55 towed parallel pipes abeam. 
AGGRESSOR was sweeping magnetic only. 
8. Six runs, 8 miles long, each run calculated to 
cover a path 800 yards wide were made covering entire area Affirm 
to insure complete coverage and to actuate delayed action mines. 
9. At 1315 on run #8 the first mine was exploded 
under the tail of the YMS-57 and at 1515 the second exploded 
under the tail of the SECURITY. On run #10 the third mine 
exploded under the tail o·f the YMS-55 at 1707. At 1811 on run 
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#11 the fourth mine was exploded under the tail of the SECURITY. 
At 1820 on the same run the fifth and last mine was exploded 
between the tails of the SECURITY and YMS-57. 
10. The positions of these explosions are shown on 
enclosure "A". The findings point to the conclusion that the 
mines were magnetic ground mines laid at an average depth of 50 
feet. A sharp shock was felt on each sweeper followed by a 
muff led roar and a column of water and up to 100 feet high after 
the explosion reached the: surface. No damage resulted to the 
sweepers or gear. A fina.l run was made without further results. 
11. At 1230, 16 June 1942, the YMS-21, BULLFINCH, 
CARDINAL, HUMMINGBIRD and. MOCKINGBIRD reported to Senior Officer 
Present Afloat on scene. The YMS-54 reported to Little Creek but 
because of faulty degaussing was unable to take part in the 
operation. The sweepers were instructed by visual signal to 
sweep in area Baker for m.agnetic and acoustic mines. The 
instructions were evidently misunderstood because the YMS-21 and 
BULLFINCH streamed 11 0 11 type gear and at 1800 the YMS-21 reported 
her sweep wire afoul of a. submerged object which she believed to 
be a mine. She was instructed to beach the object for 
examination by the District Mine Disposal Unit, which was done. 
It proved to be an old fa.shioned anchor. The CARDINAL, 
HUMMINGBIRD and MOCKINGBIRD conducted two runs with magnetic gear 
in area Baker. One run was made by the group in area Cast with 
no results. 
12. Gear wa.s recovered at 1915 and vessels secured 
at Little Creek at 2100. the CARDINAL reported upon arrival that 
the PC-524 ran over her tail and damaged it, necessitating 
amputation and splicing at Little Creek. 
13. Attention is invited to the fact that no 
vessels were sunk and no mines were exploded in the buoyed swept 
channel. 
14. Vessels of the Service Squadron, Atlantic 
Fleet, completed the sweeping of the regular channel from point 
Affirm to point X-Ray Mik.e and returned to Little Creek at 2300. 
15. The Yorktown group were ordered to return to 
Yorktown on 22 June 1942. 
APPENDIX II 
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1. H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE was proceeding as escort to a tow 
on 15 June 1942 off Virginia Beach. 
2. While proceeding fromi Moorehead City on a northerly course, 
and while approaching Buc·y 2CB, at about 2018 Eastern War Time, 
an explosion occurred in the forward portion of the ship. 
3. The ship foundered in. about three minutes. 
4. The commanding officer, one other officer, and numerous 
ratings were lost, as follows: 
Leiper, T.O.F 
Smith, W.M. 
Skipper, RNR. 
Skipper, Lt. RNR. 
Craig, Robert Ord. Sig. 
Gibbs, Cyril Sto. 1 
Grimmer, Charles R. J. Ldg. Sea H.S/D 
Hitcham, Albert Sto. 1 
Hitching, Charles H. E. Sea. S/D 
Lamplough, James A.A. 3 
MacKinnon, Norman A.A. 3 
May, Kendall J. H. S.V.G.L. 
Munden, Fred Ord. Sea. 
Palmer, Albert E. Ord. Sea. 
Pegg, William A.B. 
Stubbs, Joseph D. Ord. Sea. 
Turner, Harold G. A.A. 3 
Welby, Arthur Ord. Sig. 
Wharton, Adam A. A.B. Ord. Sea. 
Farrall, John E. Sea ex NORTHERN DAWN 
Wray, Albert W. L/Sea 11 II 
Williams, Charles E. Sea II II 
5. The survivors were rescued with despatch and had no complaint 
to register against any officer or member of the crew of the 
H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE or those engaged in the rescue. 
6. No positive evidence of the presence of submarines was 
developed in this area by patrol vessels or Naval blimp, which 
thoroughly searched the a.rea prior to and following the 
explosion. 
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7. Sweeping operations on the following day disclosed the 
presence of at least five mines not laid in the swept channel but 
in an area to south and west of 2CB in area A of Exhibit 4, which 
mines were not laid by United States forces and the 
characteristics of which cannot be determined. There had been no 
indication of the presence of mines prior to 15 June 1942. 
8. The H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE's degaussing equipment was not 
in operation due to inability of ship's generator to carry the 
load of said equipment in addition to its radio and antisubmarine 
detector. 
9. The explosion occurred at a point between three and four 
miles southwest of Buoy 2CB, which marked the entrance of the 
swept channel to the northwest. 
10. No written routing orders had been given to the commanding 
officer of the H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE. 
OPINION 
The court is of the opinion that H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLOITE 
was standing on a course which the commanding officer of the ship 
was fully justified in believing to be safe. In view of the fact 
that H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE was escorting a slow-moving tow, 
and the commanding officer's lack of information of the presence 
of enemy mines, the shorter course appeared to be more reasonable 
than a course into the channel at Point X-ray Mike where waters 
were deeper and submarines would have had greater opportunity to 
drive home an attack. 
Furthermore, the court is of the opinion that no offense has 
been committed, nor can serious blame be laid against any of the 
personnel of the H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE and that the loss of 
H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE was an unavoidable casualty of war. 
RECOMMENDATION 
No further proceedings to be had. 
Frank Lyon, 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Retired, President. 
William s. Whitted, 
Commander, U.S. Navy, Retired, Member. 
John T. Bowers, 
Commander, U.S. Navy, Retired, Member. 
APPENDIX III 
CREW OF H.M.S. KINGSTON CEYLONITE 
Source: Virginia Beach Lifesaving Museum 
Officers 
Leiper, T.O.F. 
Read, R. 
Smith, W. M. 
3433, w.s. 
2755, w.s. 
Adams, Leonard 
Bateson, Charles B. 
Bennett, Alan L. 
Butt, Wallace 
Craig, Robert 
Gibbs, Cyril 
Grimmer, Charles R.J. 
Hitcham, Albert 
Hitching, Charles H.E. 
John, David 
Kay, Joseph R. 
Lamplough, James 
MacKinnon, Norman 
May, Kendall, J.H. 
Munden, Fred 
Nunn, Percy R. 
Palmer, Albert E. 
Payne, John H. 
Pegg, William 
Potter, Christie 
Price, Thomas T. 
Rogers, Alfred W. 
Shields, Samuel A. 
Stubbs, Joseph D. 
Turner, Harold G. 
Welby, Arthur 
Wharton, Adam A. 
Wilson, Jacob 
N.K. 
LT/JX218496 
LT/JX222327 
LT/JX280396 
JX205862 
LT/KX103711 
LT/JX184424 
LT/KX100957 
LT/JX231744 
LT/JX103897 
LT/JX205647 
LT/JX197250 
LT/JX205517A 
LT/JX203606 
LT/JX280394 
LT/JX163929 
LT/JX280743 
P/JX272948 
LT/JX185669 
x 105065 
O/JX186499 
LT/KX115095 
LT/JX265118 
LT/JX277627 
LT/JX206526 
D/JX269540 
LT/JX225078 
KX97918 
Skipper, RNR. 
Skipper, RNR. 
Skipper, Lt.RNR. 
Sto. 1. 
2nd Hand 
Ord. Sea. 
Ord. Sea. 
Ord. sea. 
Sto. 1 
Ldg. Sea. H.S/D 
Sto. 1 
Sea. S/D 
2nd Eng. 
Ldg. Cook 
A.A. 3 
A.A. 3 
S.V.G.L. 
Ord. Sea. 
Ord. Sea. 
Ord. Sea. 
Ord. Tel. 
A.B. 
3rd Eng. 
Ord. Tel. 
Sto. 1 
S/D Sea. 
Ord. Sea. 
A.A. 3 
Ord. Sea. 
A.B. Ord. Sig. 
Ch. Eng. 
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Farrall, John E. JX 240547 
LT/JX174578 
LT/JX205540 
D/JX213865 
Sea. ex NORTHERN DAWN 
Wray, Albert w. 
Williams, Charles E. 
Deayton, Herbert 
L/Sea. " " 
Sea. " " 
Ord/Sig " " 
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CREW OF KINGSTON CEYLONITE KILLED IN ACTION 
Officers 
Read, R. 
Crew: 
Adams, Leonard K.N. 
Bateson, Charles B. 
Bennett, Alan L. 
Butt, Wallace 
John, David 
Kay, Joseph R. 
Nunn, Percy R. 
Payne, John H. 
Potter, Christie 
Price, Thomas T. 
Shields, Samuel A. 
Wilson, Jacob 
Deayton, H. 
3433 w.s. 
Sto. 
2nd Hand 
o Sea. 
o Sea. 
2nd Eng. 
Ldg. Cook 
o.s. 
O. Tel. 
3rd Eng. 
O. Tel. 
Sea. S/D 
Ch. Eng. 
O. Sig. 
Rogers, Alfred w. Sto. 1 
was at hospital at Moorehead city 
A true copy. Attest: 
Robert s. Berger, 
Ensign, U.S. Naval Reserve, 
Judge Advocate. 
Skipper R.N.R. 
LT/JX 218496 
LT/JX 222327 
LT/JX 280396 
LT/JX 103897 
LT/JX 205647 
LT/JX 163929 
P/JX 272948 
x 105065 
O/JX 186499 
LT/JX 265118 
KX 97918 
LT/KX 115095 
APPENDIX IV 
CONFLICTING REPORTS ON THE 
~:INGSTON CEYLONITE 
Source: Virginia Beach Lifesaving Museum 
KINGSTON CEYLONITE 
Casualties 
SOURCE: 
Boardwalk Plaque at Virginia Beach 
Upper Gallery Board at VA. Lifesaving 
British Board of Admiralty Inquiry,1942 
Frank Shield Manuscript 
ABOARD 
32 
20 
30 
USN Board of Inquiry, 1942 (troop list) 34 
Testimony by Skipper Read, RNR 
Army Harbor Defense 
summer of '42 Exhibit Map(Chewning) 
K. Fisher from USCG Annual Reports 
Weinert, Defender of the Chesapeake 
Report, 5th Naval District, Intel Ofc 
33 
32 
32 
KILLED 
17 
17 
20 
30 
20 
all 
20 
18 
all 
17 
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RESCUED 
15 
14 
15 
15 
Blank spaces indicate no information available by that source 
FLAG 
American 
British 
Panamanian 
Norwegian 
Brazlllan 
Yugoslavian 
Latvian 
Swedl1h 
Russian 
Honduran 
Greek 
Belgian 
Nicaraguan 
Cuban 
SUNK 
DAMAGED 
TOTALS 
APPENDIX V 
SUMMARY OF MERCHANT SHIP CASUALTIES 
FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT 
TORPEDOED TORPEDOED A SHELLED ENEMY MINES SHIPS LIVES REPORTED LOST Sunk Damaged Sunk Damag•d Sunk Damaged 
22 6 3 1 2 1 44 354 
11 1 0 0 12 297 
1$ 1 0 0 6 74 
3 1 0 0 4 36 
2 0 1 0 3 2 
2 0 0 0 2 5 
1 0 0 0 1 ? 
1 0 0 0 1 5 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 44 
1 0 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 ? 
1 0 0 0 1 25 
53 0 4 0 2 0 66 
0 Iii 0 1 0 1 13 
53 Iii 4 1 2 1 79 843 
Source: Harry Nash, Portsmouth Star 
TONNAGE OF SHIPS 
Sunk Damaged 
222,007 70,106 
90,462 6,985 
22,019 11,148 
17,394 6,825 
19,3$2 0 
8,331 0 
3,779 0 
15,355 0 
5,284 0 
1,698 0 
5,108 0 
6,959 0 
2,043 0 
5,441 0 
425,850 0 
0 0 
520,914 
..... 
..... 
0 
APPENDIX VI 
SHIPS SUNK IN THE FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT 
DATE POSITION SHIP NAME TYPE 
ATTACK U-BOAT 
NATIONALITY TONNAGE RESULTS CAPTAIN 
1·18·42 35·57 N SS ALLAN JACKSON Tanker Torpedo U-66 
74-20 w American 6635 Sunk Zapp 
1 ·1 Q·'42 315·00 N as LADY HAWKINS Car/Paa Torpedo u-ee 
72·30 w British 7988 Sunk Zapp 
1 ·19·42 35·42 N SS CITY OF ATLANTA Cargo Torpedo/Gun U-123 
75·21 w American 5269 Sunk Hardegen 
1 ·19·42 35·40 N SS MALAY Tanker Torpedo/Gun U·123 
75-20 w American 8207 Damaged Hardegen 
1-19·42 35·25 N SS CILTVAIRA Cargo Torpedo U·123 
75·23 w Latin 3779 Sunk Hardegen 
1 ·23·42 35-06 N MV EMPIRE GEM Tanker Torpedo U-66 
74-58 w British 8139 Sunk Zapp 
1·23·42 34·50 N SS VENORE Ore/Car Torpedo U-66 
75·20 w American 8016 Sunk Zapp 
1·27·42 38·05 N SS FRANCIS E. POWELL Tanker Torpedo U-130 
...... 
74.53 w American 7096 Sunk Kais ..... 
..... 
Source: Fielding Tyler, 
Virginia Beach Lifesaving Museum 
1-30-42 37-10 N SS ROCHESTER Tanker Torpedo/Gun U-106 73-58 w American 6836 Sunk Rasch 
1-31-42 37-33 N SS TACOMA STAR Cargo Torpedo U-109 
69-21 w British 7924 Sunk Bleichrodt 
2-1-42 36-36 N MV AMERIKALAND Ore/Car Torpedo U-106 
74-10 w Swedish 15355 Sunk Rasch 
2-8-42 37-05 N SS OCEAN VENTURE Cargo Torpedo U-108 
74-46 w British 7174 Sunk Scholtz 
2-11-42 35-00 N SS BLINK Cargo Torpedo U-108 
72-27 w Norwegian 2701 Sunk Scholtz 
2-15-42 36-31 N SS BUARQUE Cargo Torpedo U-432 
75-30 w Brazilian 5152 Sunk Schultze 
2-16-42 36-56 N SSE. H. BLUM Tanker M unknown 
75-56 w American 11615 Damaged 
2-18-42 37-30 N SS OLINDA Cargo Torpedo U-432 
75-00 w Brazilian 6400 Sunk Schultze 
...... 
-N 
2-27-42 35-33 N SS MARORE Ore/Car Torpedo/Gun U-432 
74-58 w American 8215 Sunk Schultze 
3-7-42 35-15 N SS AAABUTAN Cargo Torpedo U-155 73-55 w Brazilian 7874 Sunk Piening 
3-11-42 34-40 N SS CAAIBSEA Cargo Torpedo U-158 
76-10 w ·American 2609 Sunk Rostin 
3-13-42 37-00 N SS TREPCA Ore/Car Torpedo U-332 
73-25 w Yugoslavian 5042 Sunk Liebe 
3-14-42 34-22 N SS OLEAN Tanker Torpedo U-158 
76-29 w American 7118 Damaged Rostin 
3-15-42 34-37 N SS ARIO Tanker Torpedo U-158 
76-20 w American 6952 Sunk Rostin 
3-16-42 35-43 N MS AUSTRALIA Tanker Torpedo U-332 
75-22 w American 11628 Sunk Liebe 
3-16-42 37-03 N MV SAN DEMETRIO Tanker Torpedo U-404 
73-50 w British 8703 Sunk V. Bulow 
3-16-42 35-43 N SS CEIBA Cargo Torpedo U-124 
73-49 w Hondurian 1698 Sunk Mohr 
-
'""' w 
3-17-42 35-05 N SS ACME Tanker Torpedo U-124 
75-20 w American 6878 Damaged Mohr 
3-1.7-42 35-05 N SS KASSANDRA LOULOUDIS Cargo Torpedo U-124 75-25 w Greek 5106 Sunk Mohr 
3-18-42 34-50 N SS E.M. CLARK Tanker Torpedo U-124 
75-35 w American 9647 Sunk Mohr 
3-18-42 34-25 N SS W.E. HUTTON Tanker Torpedo U-124 
76-50 w American 7076 Sunk Mohr 
3-18-42 34-17 N SS PAPOOSE Tanker Torpedo U-124 
76-39 w American 5939 Sunk Mohr 
3-19-42 35-05 N SS LIBERATOR Cargo Torpedo U-332 
75-30 w American 7720 Sunk Liebe 
3-19-42 34-27 N SS GULF OF MEXICO Tanker Gun Unknown 
76-31 w American 7807 Escaped 
3-20-42 34-21 N MV MERCURY SUN Tanker Gun Unknown 
76-32 w American 8893 Escaped 
3-20-42 36-22 N SS OAKMAR Cargo Torpedo/Gun U-71 
Flachsenberg ...... 68-50 w American 5766 Sunk ...... 
.l:-
3-26-42 34-55 N SS DIXIE ARROW Tanker Torpedo U-71 
75-00 w American 8046 Sunk Flachsenberg 
3-26-42 36-36 N SS EQUIPOISE Cargo Torpedo U-160 74-45 w Panamanian 6210 Sunk Lassen 
3-29-42 35-16 N MV CITY OF NEW YORK Car/Pas Torpedo U-160 
74-25 w American 8272 Sunk Lassen 
3-31-42 37-34 N ALLEGHENY Barge Gun U-754 
75-25 w American 914 Sunk Oestermann 
3-31-42 37-34 N ONTARIO Barge Gun U-754 
75-25 w American 480 Damaged Oestermann 
3-31-42 37-34 N BARNEGAT Barge Gun U-754 
75-25 w American 914 Sunk Oestermann 
3-31-42 37-34 N SS MENOMINEE Tug Gun U-754 
75-25 w American 441 Sunk Oestermann 
4-1-42 36-50 N SS TIGER Tanker Torpedo U-754 
74-18 w American 5992 Sunk Oestermann 
4-1-42 35-16 N SS RIO BLANCO Cargo Torpedo U-160 
74-18 w British 4086 Sunk Lassen -
-
V1 
4-2-42 34-11 N SS LIEBRE Tanker Torpedo/Gun U-123 
76-08 w American 7057 Damaged Hardegen 
4-2-42 35-54 N MV ESSO AUGUSTA Tanker Escaped unknown 75-26 w American 11237 
4-2-42 37-57 N SS DAVID H ATWATER Coalier Gun U-552 
75-10 w American 2438 Escaped Topp 
4-3-42 36-25 N SS OTHO Car/Pas Torpedo U-754 
75-22 w American 4839 Sunk Oestermann 
4-4-42 36-08 N SS BYRON T BENSON Tanker Torpedo U-552 
75-32 w American 7953 Sunk Topp 
4-6-42 34-25 N MV BIDWELL Tanker Torpedo U-160 
75-57 w American 6837 Damaged Lassen 
4-6-42 35-07 N MV BRITISH SPLENDOUR Tanker Torpedo U-552 
75-19 w British 7138 Sunk Topp 
4-7-42 35-08 N SS LANCING Tanker Torpedo U-552 
75-22 w Norwegian 7866 Sunk Topp 
4-9-42 34-28 N SS MALCHACE Cargo Torpedo U-160 
i--
75-56 w American 3516 Sunk Lassen i--
°' 
4-9-42 34-27 N SS ATLAS Tanker Torpedo U-552 
76-16 w American 7137 Sunk Topp 
4-9-92 35-35 N MV SAN DELFINO Tanker Torpedo U-203 
75-06 w British 8072 Sunk Mutzelburg 
4-10-42 34-25 N SS TAMAULIPAS Tanker Torpedo U-552 
76-00 w American 6943 Sunk Topp 
4-11-42 34-25 N SS HARRY F. SINCLAIR, JR Tanker Torpedo U-203 
76-30 w American 6151 Damaged Mutzelburg 
4-11-42 34-23 N SS ULYSSES Car/Pas Torpedo U-160 
75-35 w British 14647 Sunk Lassen 
4-14-42 35-08 N SS EMPIRE THRUSH Cargo Torpedo U-203 
75-18 w British 6160 Sunk Mutzelburg 
4-16-42 35-35 N SS DESERT LIGHT Cargo Torpedo U-572 
72-48 w Panamanian 2368 Sunk Hirsacker 
4-16-42 35-34 N SS ALCOA GUIDE Cargo Gun U-123 
70-08 w American 4834 Sunk Hardegen 
4-18-42 35-32 N SS AXTELL J. BYLES Tanker Torpedo U-136 
i-75-19 w American 8955 Damaged Zimmerma11il i-
....... 
4-20-42 36-25 N SS CHENANGO Cargo Torpedo U-84 
74-55 w Panamanian 3014 Sunk Uphoff 
4·24·42 37·00 N SS EMPIRE DRUM Cargo .Torpedo U-136 69-15 w British 7244 Sunk Zimmermann 
4·29·42 34-19 N SS ASCHABAD Cargo Torpedo U-402 
76-31 w Russian 5284 Sunk V. Forstner 
5·12-42 Cape HMS BEDFORDSHIRE Armed Trawler Torpedo U-588 
Lookout British 913 Sunk Krech 
5·18·42 34·45 N SS C.J. BARKDULL Tanker Torpedo unknown 
75-38 w Panamanian 6733 Escaped 
6·1 ·42 36·10 N SS WEST NOTUS Cargo Gun/Scuttling Charge U-404 
68·20 w American 5492 Sunk V. Balow 
6·11-42 34·52 N SS F.W. ABRAMS Tanker Mine U.S. Mines 
75.45 w American 9310 Sunk 
6-15·42 36-52 N SS ROBERT C. TUTTLE Tanker Mine U-701 
75·51 w American "11615 Damaged Degen 
6·15-42 36-52 N MV ESSO AUGUSTA Tanker Mine U-701 
75-51 w American 11237 Damaged Degen 
t--' 
6·15-42 36-52 N HMS KINGSTON CEYLONITE Armed Trawler Mine U-701 t--' 00 
75-51 w British 448 Sunk Degen 
6-~7-42 36-52 N SS SANTORE Ore/Car Mine U-701 75-52 w American 7117 Sunk Degen 
6-17-42 36-52 N BAINBRIDGE Destroyer Mine U-701 
75-51 w American 1190 Damaged Degen 
6-19-42 1 O Miles From USS YP-389 Armed Trawler Gun U-701 
Diamond Head American 165 Sunk Degen 
6-24-42 34-30 N SS LJUBICA MATKOVIC Cargo Torpedo U-404 
75-40 w Yugoslavian 3289 Sunk V. Bulow 
6-24-42 34-30 N SS NORDAL Cargo Torpedo U-404 
75-40 w Panamanian 3845 Sunk V. Bulow 
6-24-42 34-30 N SS MANUELA Cargo Torpedo U-404 
75-40 w American 4772 Sunk V. Bulow 
6-25-42 34-59 N MV TAMESIS Car/Pas Torpedo U-701 
75-41 w Norwegian 7256 Damaged Degen 
6-27-42 38-03 N MV MOLDANGER Cargo Torpedo U-404 
70-52 w Norwegian 6827 Sunk V. Bulow ::: 
\0 
6-27-42 34-45 N MV BRITISH FREEDOM Tanker Torpedo U-701 
75-22 w British 6985 Damaged Degen 
6-28-42 
7-1-42 
7-10-42 
7-15-42 
7-15-42 
35-07 N 
75-07 w 
35-10 N 
70-53 w 
33-44 N 
75-19 w 
34-53 N 
75-22 w 
34-46 N 
75-22 w 
SS WM. ROCKEFELLER 
American 
SS CITY OF BIRMINGHAM 
American 
MV J.A. MOWINCKEL 
Panamanian 
SS CHILORE 
American 
MV BLUEFIELDS 
Nicaraguan 
Tanker 
14054 
Cargo 
5861 
Tanker 
11148 
Cargo 
8310 
Cargo 
2063 
Torpedo 
Sunk 
Torpedo 
Sunk 
Torpedo/Mine 
Damaged 
Torpedo/Mine 
Sunk 
Torpedo 
Sunk 
U-701 
Degen 
U-202 
Linder 
U-576 
Heinicke 
U-576 
Heinicke 
U-576 
Heinicke 
....... 
N 
0 
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